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Accounting regulators are concerned about the potential threat of long-term auditor-
client relationships on auditor independence, leading to lower audit quality.  The main 
objective of this study is to examine the association between auditor tenure and an 
important feature of accounting, namely conservatism.  Following Basu (1997) and Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000), I define conservatism as the quicker recognition in earnings of 
bad news about expected future cash flows.  I investigate whether long-term auditor-
client relationships are associated with less timely recognition of earnings to bad news, 
and a lower rate of reversal of negative earnings changes.   
The overall results strongly show that conservatism decreases as auditor tenure 
lengthens. The results are robust across various measures of conservatism and a series of 
sensitivity tests.  However, auditors’ litigation exposure appears to be able to mitigate the 
adverse impact of auditor tenure.  In additional tests, I find that the reduced conservatism 
is not driven by the larger clients that auditors have incentives to retain.  Moreover, I find 
that even industry specialists could not avoid the negative impact of longer auditor-client 
relationships on conservatism.  The study provides some support to the regulators who 
are concerned about the potential negative impact of auditor tenure on audit quality and 









 High-profile corporate failures that occurred at the beginning of this century have 
raised concern about the reliability of companies’ financial statements.  While the 
primary responsibility for preparing accurate financial statements rests with company 
management and boards, questions also have been raised about the quality and 
independence of external auditors.  Regulators and standard setters have attempted to 
enhance audit quality through rules impacting on auditor independence.  For example, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter “SOX”) directly restricts the provision of non-
audit services performed by the external auditor of a client.  Auditor tenure also has been 
the subject of regulatory intervention (AICPA 1992, SOX 2002), with a stated concern 
that long-term relationships between companies and their auditors create a level of over-
familiarity that impairs auditor independence and reduces audit quality.  The concern is 
not new.  Over 40 years ago, Mautz and Sharaf (1961, page 208) stated that: “the great 
threat to his independence is a slow, gradual, almost casual erosion of this honest 
disinterestedness – the auditor in charge must constantly remind his assistants of the 
importance and operational meaning of independence…” 
Mandatory rotation of audit firms for a particular audit client is suggested as a means 
of improving audit quality through maintained independence and new “fresh eyes” on 
audits.  However, the accounting profession has strongly resisted mandatory audit firm 
rotation, with potentially high costs of transition being provided as the prominent reason 
(e.g., Sinnett 2004, International Code Council – ICC 2005).  Furthermore, empirical 
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studies do not consistently document a negative impact of auditor tenure on audit quality.  
For example, Myers et al. (2003) provide evidence that audit firm tenure is positively 
associated with earnings quality measured by both signed and absolute values of 
discretionary accruals.  Carcello and Nagy (2004) find that fraudulent reporting is more 
likely to occur in the early years of auditor-client relationships.   
The primary objective of this study is to further examine regulators’ concern about 
the impact of auditor tenure.  In particular, the study extends prior research to investigate 
the association of long auditor tenure with an important feature of financial reporting, 
namely accounting conservatism.  The conservatism principle has influenced accounting 
practice and theory for centuries (Basu 1997).  Following Basu (1997) and Watts (2003a, 
2003b), conservatism is defined as the application of a higher standard of verification for 
favorable information, whereby accounting income reflects “bad news” on a more timely 
basis than “good news”.  Ball and Shivakumar (2005) refer to this news-dependent 
conservatism as conditional conservatism, and argue that only conditional conservatism 
can increase debt and contracting efficiency.1  The timely recognition of bad news in 
earnings is argued to be consistent with higher quality accounting relative to overly 
aggressive accounting (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Watts 2003a, 2003b, Basu 1997, 
Francis et al. 2005, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, 2006).  However, if a longer auditor-
client relationship adversely affects auditor independence, leading to auditors’ 
                                                 
 
 
1 In contrast, unconditional conservatism involves predetermined understatement of the book value of net 
assets, which is independent of economic information. Unconditional conservatism can not be contracting 
efficient (Basu 1997, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Ruddock et al. 2006). A more detailed discussion on the 
concept of conservatism is provided in Chapter 3. 
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acquiescence to managers’ aggressive practices, the extent of conservatism would be 
reduced as auditor tenure is extended.  
It is argued that the slow erosion of auditor independence would be minimized under 
a mandatory rotation regime where the length of time an auditor can serve a particular 
client is limited to a fixed number of years (Geiger et al. 1998).  Accounting standard 
setters and regulators expressed this concern in the passage of SOX (i.e., requiring the 
study of mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms not later than one year 
after the date of enactment of SOX).  Therefore, the effect of auditor tenure on 
accounting conservatism should be of interest to both the accounting profession and to 
accounting regulators.   
I operationalize conditional conservatism in a number of ways.  Two tests of 
conditional conservatism based on Basu (1997) are widely applied in empirical 
accounting research.  First, I use a piece-wise linear regression of earnings on 
contemporaneous stock returns to examine whether long auditor tenure is associated with 
slower recognition in earnings of bad news.  Second, I examine whether auditor tenure is 
negatively related to the rate of the reversal of negative earnings changes, where a lower 
rate of reversal indicates reduced conservatism.  Finally, to overcome the potential 
limitations associated with the interpretations and assumptions underlying the approaches 
of Basu (1997), I also test conditional conservatism using the model suggested in Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005, 2006), that is, accrual-based conditional conservatism. 
Jenkins and Velury (2006) examine the association between auditor tenure and 
conservative earnings and find that conservatism increases as auditor tenure lengthens.  
However, their research design is subject to several important limitations.  First, potential 
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omitted variables that relate to conservatism might overestimate the significance of 
auditor tenure.  For example, firm size could drive the observed positive association 
between auditor tenure and conservatism.  Second, they do not control for the possibility 
that auditor tenure choice is an endogenous variable in tests of conservatism.  
Accordingly, the simultaneity bias could negatively affect the results.  Third, prior studies 
suggest that accounting conservatism varies over time (e.g., as auditors’ exposure to 
litigation risk changes) (Basu 1997, Basu et al. 2001a).  Hence, the pooled estimates over 
time may fail to accurately capture the effect of auditor tenure on conservatism in 
individual subperiods.  Fourth, Jenkins and Velury (2006) measure auditor tenure as of 
1980 while the analysis is from 1983 to 2004.  Thus, in the earlier years of the sample 
period, many observations with longer auditor tenure are incorrectly measured as with 
short auditor tenure, which could significantly impact their results.  My study more 
deeply investigates the relation between auditor tenure and conditional accounting 
conservatism.   
The overall results strongly show that conditional conservatism decreases as auditor 
tenure increases, which suggests that long-term auditor-client relationships cause auditors 
to compromise independence and require less conservative reporting by clients.  In 
additional analysis, I find that the adverse impact of auditor tenure on conservatism is 
mitigated during high auditor litigation exposure.  Further, I find that the adverse impact 
of auditor tenure on audit quality is not driven by clients with great economic influence.  
Rather, the reduced conservatism is less evident in clients with the greatest influence, 
which suggests that the concern of the greater litigation risk and reputation loss 
associated with large clients changes auditors’ behavior.  Finally, I do not find evidence 
 5 
of industry specialist auditors being able to play an active role in maintaining auditor 
independence as auditor-client relationships lengthen.  In other words, reduced 
conservatism with longer auditor tenure is prevalent in all accounting firms regardless of 
their industry expertise.  
The study contributes to the existing research in several ways.  First, it examines an 
important feature of the auditor-client relationship, in particular, the duration of this 
relationship, and its impact on accounting conservatism.  The issue is timely and 
important given the concern regarding the effect of longer audit tenure on audit quality.  
Given that accounting conservatism is a universal demand for auditors and stakeholders 
(Ball et al. 2000, Basu et al. 2001b) and an important feature in high-quality financial 
reporting, examining the association between accounting conservatism and auditor tenure 
provides important insights.  The results from this study provide further evidence on the 
issue of mandatory auditor rotation, which is of interest to regulators and standard setters.  
The detrimental effect of longer auditor tenure on auditor independence observed in this 
study would reinforce the position of regulators who wish to promulgate and implement 
rules for mandatory audit firm rotation.   
Recent research on accounting conservatism suggests that not only does 
conservatism in accounting exist, but that the practice of accounting has become more 
conservative in the last 40 years (Basu 1997, Givoly and Hayn 2000, Holthausen and 
Watts 2001, Ryan and Zarowin 2003).  Prior research investigates and finds that the 
extent of conditional conservatism as measured by asymmetric timeliness varies across 
firms’ characteristics and economic contexts (Basu et al. 2001b, Ball et al. 2000, 2003, 
Chandra et al.2004, Beekes et al. 2004, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Bushman and 
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Piotroski 2006).  The study extends this line of research by suggesting that auditor tenure 
could be one potential factor that drives the observed differences in conservatism for 
public companies.  Specifically, longer auditor tenure could lead to lower level of 
conservative reporting.   
With respect to research design, this study uses simultaneous equations to avoid 
possible endogeneity problems arising from self selection (i.e., decision to retain the 
incumbent auditors).  Endogeneity problems, which are often ignored in prior studies, 
could mistakenly affect the interpretation of the results.  In addition, the consistent results 
based on the two measures of conditional conservatism from Basu (1997) and one 
alternative measure from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) make the conclusions more robust 
and convincing.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 introduces the 
background of mandatory auditor rotation.  Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework 
of auditor tenure and audit quality.  Chapter 4 discusses accounting conservatism and 
develops the hypotheses for this study.  I present the research design in Chapter 5, 
including operationalized hypotheses, model specifications, and sample selection 
procedures.  Chapter 6 presents the results.  Discussions of the results and conclusions are 





2.1 The Debate on Mandatory Auditor Rotation in the U.S. 
Regulators and the business press are interested in whether long-term relationships 
between companies and their auditors create a level of closeness that impairs auditor 
independence and reduces audit quality (AICPA 1978, 1992, Turner and Godwin 1999).  
The major financial reporting failures in 2001-2002 led to a series of new financial 
reporting regulations in SOX.  Among the most important rules in SOX are those that 
relate to auditor independence and audit quality.  They include restrictions on non-audit 
services to audit clients, increased audit committee responsibilities, the establishment of 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and mandatory rotation of 
lead and reviewing audit partners after five consecutive years on an engagement.   
In a 1992 position statement, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountant 
(AICPA) argued that mandatory auditor rotation would be costly and counterproductive 
as well as ineffective in improving audit quality.  While SOX does not impose mandatory 
rotation on audit firms, section 207 required the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(hereafter “GAO”) to study the potential effects of mandatory rotation of registered 
public accounting firms.  The GAO’s study included surveys and interviews of various 
stakeholders.  The study found that all the large public accounting firms, most of the 
chief financial officers in Fortune 1000 companies, and the companies’ audit committee 
chairs believed that the costs of mandatory audit firm rotation likely exceeds the benefits.  
The GAO concludes that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient 
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way to enhance auditor independence and audit quality, considering the additional 
financial costs and the loss of institutional knowledge of a public company’s previous 
auditor of record” (GAO 2003). 
About 79 percent of public accounting firms and public companies contend that the 
risk of audit failure might increase due to the lack of client-specific knowledge during the 
initial years of engagements.  Nearly all large public accounting firms estimated that 
initial year audit costs under mandatory audit firm rotation would increase by more than 
20 percent over subsequent-year costs to acquire the necessary understanding of the new 
client and its business (Sinnett 2004).  Such costs include learning the client’s business 
environment and other indirect costs that result from reduced competence (Hamilton et al. 
2005).  Aside from the increased costs, the profession asserts that there is no evidence 
that long-term auditor tenure impairs audit quality, and often claims that there is a 
positive relation between auditor tenure and audit quality (Elliott et al. 2000, Copeland 
2002, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002).   
A more compelling argument against mandatory auditor rotation would be a lack of 
auditor choice.  Since Big 4 audit firms perform the audits for a large proportion of 
publicly held corporations, the choice of any subsequent auditor on a rotation is limited.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Big 4 will gain greater market share if auditor 
rotation is mandatory, which will lead to a less competitive environment without 
addressing the related policy issues (Sinnett 2004).  
 
2.2 Policy of Mandatory Auditor Rotation in Other Countries 
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The debate on the effect of long-term, auditor-client relationships on audit quality is 
not limited to the U.S.  It is also the concern of many other countries that experience 
events involving publicly listed firms’ fraud and bankruptcy.  Italy is the first country 
since 1974 to adopt a periodic rotation of auditing firms.  The audit engagement may be 
re-tendered every three years and the same public accounting firm may serve as auditor 
for a maximum of nine years.  There is also a minimum time lag of three years before the 
previous auditor can be reappointed.2  In Brazil, the rule of mandatory auditor rotation 
after five years was adopted in 1996 for banks and extended to listed companies in 1999.  
Since 1991, the regulatory authority in Korea has designated external auditors for a group 
of firms that are deemed to have strong incentives or great potential for accounting 
manipulation.  In 2003, Korea required mandatory auditor rotation for all companies 
listed on Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) or registered in Korea Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ).3  Singapore and India also require mandatory auditor 
rotation, but only for some companies.  For example, from March 2002, banks in 
Singapore should terminate the current public accounting firms if they have audited the 
bank for the previous five consecutive years (the rule does not apply to foreign banks 
operating in the country).    
Some countries established mandatory auditor rotation, but subsequently dropped it.  
For example, in 1989 the Spanish parliament passed an act requiring mandatory audit 
firm rotation with a maximum term of nine years, which included mandatory retention of 
                                                 
 
 
2 The new 2005 bill in Italy has proposed an extension of the maximum term to 12 years. 
3 There are some exceptions for foreign investment companies which are subsidiaries of foreign parent 
companies and companies listed on foreign exchanges (NASDAQ, NYSE, and London Stock Exchange 
only). 
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three years.  However, the rule was dropped in 1995.  The rule reversal was superficially 
due to the pressure from the accounting profession.  That reversal occurred before the 
rule would have had an effect (i.e., before companies would have to rotate auditors).  
Further, the rule reversal may have been more attributable to political convenience – a 
bargaining chip exchanged for political support in the political market for legislative 
proposals (Gibbons 1999).4   Austria, under the Commercial Law of 2004, required 
mandatory audit firm rotation every six years with a minimum time lag of three years 
before the previous auditor can be reappointed.  However, the implementation needed 
approval at the European Union level, and in 2005, the requirement was dropped by the 
company law.  Until 1991, Canada required banks to rotate their auditors.  In 1991, 
banking legislation was amended and the mandatory audit firm rotation requirement was 
abandoned.   
In other countries (U.K., Sweden, U.S.), mandatory auditor rotation has been 
analyzed and discussed, but rejected.  Hence, although regulators around the world are 
concerned about declining audit quality with long-term auditor tenure, mandatory 
rotation has been introduced in only a very small number of countries.  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
4 At the time the Spanish Audit law was enacted requiring mandatory auditor rotation, the Socialist party 
had obtained a parliamentary majority. However, following the 1993 general election, the Socialist party no 
longer had a parliamentary majority. To seek support for approval of a new regulation from the dominant 
political group (Convergènia i Unió), the Socialist group agreed to remove the requirement of mandatory 
audit firm rotation.    
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CHAPTER 3 
AUDIT QUALITY AND AUDITOR TENURE  
 
3.1 The Concept of Audit Quality  
The association between a long auditor-client relationship and audit quality is not 
simple because economic, financial, and social factors could drive the final result.  Audit 
services are demanded as monitoring devices because of the potential conflicts of interest 
between company owners and managers as well as those among different classes of 
security holders (Watts 1977, Watts and Zimmerman 1981).  Most empirical research 
defines audit quality relative to audit risk, which is the risk that an auditor will fail to 
modify the opinion on audited financial statements that are materially misstated.   
DeAngelo (1981b) defines audit quality as the market-assessed joint probability that 
an auditor will discover a breach in a client’s accounting system, and conditional on 
discovery, report the breach.  Most other definitions of audit quality, although diverse, 
reflect the same structure.  For example, Wallace (1980) argues that audit quality is a 
measure of the auditors’ ability to reduce noise and improve fineness in accounting data.  
Lee et al. (1999) define audit quality as the probability that an auditor will not issue an 
unqualified report for statements containing material errors.  Titman and Trueman (1986) 
and Beatty (1989) define audit quality as the accuracy of the information reported by 
auditors.  A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts (American Accounting Association 
1973, SAR #6) refers to the ability of the auditor to exert control over the quality of 
information produced through assuring conformance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).  DeAngelo’s definition captures attributes critical to the 
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role played by auditors in financial statement preparation.  Thus, audit quality combines 
the ability of an auditor to detect a breach (auditor competence) and the willingness to 
report such a breach (auditor independence).   
An important consideration in DeAngelo’s definition is the market-assessed 
probabilities, that is, it hinges on the market’s perception as to whether a given auditor 
will perform the audit competently and the perceived degree of auditor independence.  
Watkins et al. (2004) refer to the concept of market perception of audit quality as auditor 
reputation, which directly relates to what SAR #6 describes as the ability of the audit to 
enhance the credibility of financial information.  On the other hand, the actual audit 
quality improves the reliability of financial information by reducing the noise contained 
in financial statements.  Although the perceived auditor independence and competence 
may be positively correlated with actual auditor independence and competence, they are 
not necessarily the same.  To maintain this distinction, consistent with the study of 
Watkins et al. (2004), I use the term “auditor reputation” and “auditor monitoring 
strength” to capture perceived and actual attributes of audit quality, respectively.   
Figure 1 presents a schematic that shows the relation between the components of 
audit quality and their influence on financial statement information.  Auditor monitoring 
strength represents the auditors’ ability to provide objective reports on the true but 
externally unobservable circumstances of the client.  Two components, actual auditor 
competence and auditor independence in fact (i.e., auditor objectivity) determine the 
effectiveness of an auditor’s monitoring strength.  Auditor reputation refers to users’ 
beliefs about auditor monitoring strength, which they can not directly observe, including 
perceived auditor competence and independence in appearance.  Auditor reputation 
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affects information credibility or the perceived reliability of the financial statements, 










3.2 Auditor Tenure and Auditor Monitoring Strength 
Auditor independence in fact plays a crucial role in determining the reliability of the 
auditor’s report.  The first implication of this feature is that auditor independence in fact 
can improve the credibility of published financial reports and add value to stakeholders.  
The second implication directly relates to the auditing profession, that is, the agency 
conflict between management and a company’s stakeholders drives the demand for 
independent audits, which provides a monitoring device designed to improve information 
transparency and reduce information asymmetry.   
Auditor Reputation 





Independence in Fact 
Actual Auditor Competence 
Information Credibility 




Information quality, determined by auditor monitoring strength, is a crucial input in 
financial statement quality.  Auditors interact with management daily during the audit, 
and this relationship obtains regardless of the length of auditor tenure.  Opponents of 
mandatory auditor rotation argue that auditors’ expertise with clients will increase as 
auditor tenure lengthens.  Auditors must possess the ability to gauge when management 
has incentives to withhold available information, and this ability to a large extent arises 
from auditors learning about the client and its management through long-term 
cooperation.  Mandatory auditor rotation will adversely affect auditors’ accumulation of 
specific knowledge about their clients.  In addition, a game-theoretical model by Yu et al. 
(2004) shows that mandatory auditor rotation can have adverse effects on auditor 
independence because it undermines the incentives to build up a reputation for auditors’ 
honesty, especially in the last period before rotation.  Meanwhile, a newly appointed 
auditor might fail because of a lack of a thorough understanding of the client.  Incumbent 
auditors can profit from their learning curve effect in the detection of material errors or 
breach (DeAngelo 1981a).  
Because actual audit quality is hard to observe by outsiders, prior research adopts 
various observable measures as proxies for actual audit quality.  These proxies include 
discretionary accruals, the cost of debt financing, missed going-concern reports (e.g., 
failure to issue going concern reports before bankruptcy filings), financial restatements, 
auditor litigation and fraud.  These studies generally find little evidence in support of 
mandatory auditor rotation: that is, the findings suggest that financial reporting quality 
and audit quality are increasing rather than decreasing in the length of auditor-client 
relationship. 
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The earlier studies of the effects of auditor tenure focus on audit failures.  These 
studies provide evidence that alleged audit failures are more likely in the earlier years of 
an auditor-client relationship.  For example, Stice (1991) reports that approximately 30 
percent of companies in his litigation sample had auditor tenure of three years or less.  
Beasley et al. (2000) find that initial audits were 38 percent of their sample of SEC 
enforcement actions against auditors.  Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) test for the 
association between the type of audit opinion issued on the financial statements 
immediately prior to bankruptcy and the length of auditor tenure.  Their results suggest 
that auditors are less likely to modify opinions on financial statements immediately 
preceding bankruptcy during the initial years of engagement with a client.  Carcello and 
Nagy (2004) examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial 
reporting and find that fraudulent reporting is more likely to occur in the early years of 
auditor-client relationships.  Stanley and DeZoort (2007) find a negative relation between 
the length of the auditor-client relationship and the likelihood of restatement.  They find 
that audit failures were more likely to occur in the initial years of an audit engagement 
instead of later years. 
Myers et al. (2003) examine the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality 
using both the signed and absolute value of discretionary accruals as proxies for earnings 
quality.  Their results suggest that higher earnings quality is associated with longer 
auditor tenure, which they interpret as evidence that longer auditor tenure enables 
auditors to constrain management’s opportunistic behavior.  Although Myers et al. (2005) 
find that misstatements increasing core earnings are more likely in quarterly financial 
statements as tenure lengthens, auditor tenure is not associated with a significant increase 
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in the propensity for restatements of annual financial statements, which implies that as 
tenure increases auditors are more likely to detect errors contained in quarterly reports 
and correct them in annual reports.  All of these empirical studies imply that mandatory 
limits on the duration of the auditor-client relationship will likely impose unintended 
costs on capital markets (Mansi et al. 2004). 
On the other hand, regulators and the press allege that a long auditor-client 
relationship can decrease auditor monitoring strength (i.e., actual auditor competence and 
auditor independence).  In particular, a long term auditor-client relationship creates a 
level of closeness that impairs auditor independence and reduces audit quality.  The 
nature of auditing requires that auditors interact intensively with their clients.  Long-term 
relationships may result in ‘overfamilarity’ between management and the auditor and 
increase the likelihood of yielding to the inevitable client pressure in an audit conflict and 
even the auditor/client collusions.  The experience of Enron and Andersen illustrate this 
point well.  Andersen auditors and their consultants were given permanent office space at 
Enron headquarters.  They frequently met in office parties and attended various 
entertainment activities.  Under this situation, it is difficult for auditors to keep a high 
level of professional skepticism with regard to their clients (i.e., impaired independence 
in fact).5  In addition, management can take advantage of the auditor’s conflict by making 
a personal appeal for understanding and support.  Thus, auditors’ reduced independence 
might arise either consciously or subconsciously.  Proponents of mandatory auditor 
rotation claim that auditor rotation can create a fresh new ‘eye’ on management and then 
                                                 
 
 
5 Compustat shows that Enron Corporation had retained Andersen as its auditor at least from 1974 to 2001 
(1974 is the first year that Compustat has available data about auditors).  
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reestablish a clean atmosphere between auditors and their clients to maintain auditors’ 
objectivity.   
Furthermore, as auditor tenure lengthens, auditors may become stale and view the 
audit as a simple repetition of earlier engagements (i.e., reduced actual competence).  
According to Shockley (1982), a long auditor-client relationship can have the following 
effects: ‘complacency, lack of innovation, less rigorous audit procedures and a learned 
confidence in the client may arise after long association with the client’.  Arel et al. (2005) 
point out that auditors returning to an engagement rely on prior-year workpapers to help 
plan the audit, set the budget, and provide information needed for the current-year audit.  
The staleness fosters a tendency for auditors to over-rely on previous work and anticipate 
results rather than keeping alert to subtle but important changes in circumstances, 
especially when the current-year auditor is reviewing his or her own workpapers from the 
prior year.   
DeAngelo (1981b) assumed that incumbent auditors have some economic incentives 
not to disclose material errors or breaches, the reason being to retain clients.  This 
incentive arises from the incumbent auditor wanting to protect his or her investment in 
client-specific expertise that is gradually built up during long term cooperation.  Thus, the 
auditor’s incentive to preserve independence declines over time.  Vanstraelen (2000) 
examines Belgian companies and finds that for both financially distressed and non-
distressed companies, long-term auditor-client relationships significantly increase the 
likelihood of an unqualified opinion or significantly reduce the auditor’s willingness to 
qualify audit reports.  However, the different business environment in Belgium could 
make findings not applicable to public firms in the U.S.  Dopuch et al. (2001) 
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experimentally assess whether mandatory rotation increases independence by examining 
auditors’ willingness to issue a report biased in favor of management.  The results are 
consistent with the prediction that mandatory auditor rotation can improve an auditor’s 
independence. 
Although most studies, as mentioned earlier, provide results that reject mandatory 
auditor rotation, a few empirical studies report results consistent with a negative relation 
between audit quality and auditor tenure.  For example, Deis and Giroux (1992) find that 
longer tenure is associated with reduced audit quality in a setting of public school 
districts audited by small audit firms.  In contrast to the findings of Carcello and Nagy 
(2004) that focus on the relation between auditor tenure and SEC enforcement actions 
against auditors in 1990-2001, Casterella et al. (2002) consider the effect of auditor 
tenure during 1980-1991 with respect to fraud, litigation against auditors, and auditor 
reporting prior to bankruptcy and find that audit quality is lower as auditor tenure 
increases.   
Davis et al. (2005) find that firms with both short (three years or less) and long (15 
years or more) tenure are more likely to have smaller absolute forecast errors, and more 
likely to meet or beat earnings forecasts using discretionary accruals.6  The results 
suggest a trade-off between audit quality and auditor tenure; that is, while audit quality 
may deteriorate as auditor tenure lengthens, audit quality also suffers in new 
engagements.   
                                                 
 
 
6 One could argue that the findings are against mandatory auditor rotation since the impact of a long term 
auditor-client relationship is non-monotonic.  
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One recent study, Carey and Simnett (2006), uses unique data from Australia, where 
the audit partner can be identified, to examine the association between audit quality and 
long audit partner tenure.  They find that longer audit partner tenure is associated with a 
lower propensity to issue a going-concern opinion and a higher propensity for clients to 
just beat earnings benchmarks, although there is no evidence of an association of long 
audit partner tenure with abnormal working capital accruals.  In addition, Nagy (2005) 
examines the effect of mandatory auditor change on audit quality in the unique 
environment created by the failure of Arthur Andersen (AA).  He finds a lower audit 
quality in short auditor tenure periods for small firms, with this negative relation 
effectively mitigated over the period of AA’s demise.7  Although the demise of AA does 
not truly replicate a mandatory rotation regime, it does provide a rich setting to examine 
one aspect of such a regime – the effect that a forced auditor change has on the level of 
audit quality (Nagy 2005).  
Taken together, a few findings from the research above are consistent with the 
argument that long auditor relationships are detrimental to audit quality.  Daniels and 
Booker (2005) suggest that regulators should continue to consider requiring rotation of 
audit firms in publicly traded companies.  It is recognized, however, that an inherent 
difficulty in studies on the effect of mandatory auditor rotation is that the auditor-client 
relationship can only be observed under the current system: that is, we are unable to 
assess the relative merits of a system that mandates auditor rotation (not available now in 
                                                 
 
 
7 Nagy (2005) finds no improved audit quality following the forced auditor change from AA for larger 
companies. He argues that the results could reflect higher bargaining power of larger companies toward 
their auditors.  
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the U.S.) compared to one that does not require rotation (Church and Zhang 2007).  
Chung (2004) and Kim and Yi (2006) examined the impact of limited auditor tenure on 
earnings and audit quality using a sample of firms in Korea, which established mandatory 
auditor rotation in 1990.  The results show that discretionary accruals of firms that fulfill 
the rotation requirement decrease after the passage to a mandatory rotation regime, which 
suggests that auditor rotation enhances audit quality. 
 
3.3 Auditor Tenure and Auditor Reputation  
As shown in Figure 1, auditor reputation consists of auditor independence in 
appearance and perceived auditor competence, both of which reflect the belief of users of 
financial reports on the credibility of information.  Experimental research provides some 
evidence that a long relationship with clients is perceived to impair auditor independence.  
For example, Knapp (1991) finds that audit committee members perceive that audit 
quality is positively correlated with the length of auditor tenure in the early years of an 
auditor-client relationship and negatively correlated in subsequent years.  He argues that 
audit committee members more likely perceive that a learning curve effect in the early 
years results in a gradual improvement in audit quality and after a number of years, there 
is some kind of a turning point in the auditor-client relationship which can be detrimental 
to the auditor’s independence.  Hussey and Lan (2001) analyzed the opinions of financial 
directors in the U.K. about the factors that influence the independence of external 
auditors.  The regression of audit firm rotation on variables such as the perception of 
audit quality, the costs of the audit, and the assessment of the nature of the relationship 
with external auditors suggests that the perception of audit independence would be 
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enhanced by mandating auditor rotation. O’Leary (1996) conducted a survey on the 
perception of auditor independence and the consequences that mandatory auditor rotation 
may have among the most important listed companies in Australia.  The survey shows 
that 63% of public firms consider the introduction of such a proposal as a useful means of 
improving the perception of auditor independence.  Thus, consistent with the concern of 
regulators, a longer auditor-client relationship is associated with lower perceived auditor 
independence.8   
An empirical study by Ghosh and Moon (2005) examines whether the stock market 
perceives auditor tenure positively.  In particular, the authors use earnings response 
coefficients (ERC) as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality.  They 
document a positive association between ERC and auditor tenure.  In addition, they find 
that the influence of past earnings on one-year-ahead analyst earnings forecasts becomes 
greater as auditor tenure increases.  The positive perception of long auditor tenure could 
arise in the following situations.  First, investors perceive that auditors will become more 
competent in terms of client-specific knowledge when they involve a long-term working 
relationship with clients.  Second, the perceived auditor independence increases as tenure 
lengthens.  Thus, this study suggests that the stock market rewards companies with long-
term auditors and that mandatory auditor rotation will harm the perceived high audit 
quality associated with longer auditor tenure.  
In sum, whether a long auditor-client relationship reduces auditor monitoring 
strength and auditor reputation is empirically ambiguous.  The observed discrepancy in 
                                                 
 
 
8 Some analytical studies acknowledge this point of view, but they consider the introduction of mandatory 
rotation rule as an excessive tool with uncertain benefit (e.g., Gietzmann and Sen 2002, Yu et al. 2004). 
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findings across studies, however, could arise from research design differences, including 
different sample selection, omitted variables, and/or model specification error, which will 
be discussed in more detail in the next section.  Thus, the actual relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit quality could be positive, negative, or even neutral.  The neutral 
effect appears because it is possible that positive and negative effects are offset or 
because litigation risk and reputation protection dominate auditors and drive them to 
maintain objectivity during audits.  Inconsistent findings between perceived lower auditor 
independence in experimental and survey research and positive stock market reaction 
documented in empirical studies (with long-term auditor tenure) may indicate that 
individual judgment differs from actual decision making in investment settings.  The 
laboratory perceptions of auditor independence with long auditor tenure may have little 
impact on the decision making of financial statement users.  
Regulators’ concern regarding the impact of auditor tenure is certainly justifiable; 
however, regulators do not always act in the “public interest”.  The seminal book ‘The 
Calculus of Consent’, written by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), notes that self-interest 
drives the collective decision-making process, regardless of whether the motives of each 
individual are altruistic or not.  Thus, regulatory decisions may not reflect what the facts 
are, and they are often “symbolic” rather than “real” implementation.  The mandatory 
auditor rotation rule in Spain provides a good example here.  Many studies highlighted 
the Spanish case as an illustration of the failure of mandatory auditor rotation; however, 
mandatory audit firm rotation was never given the chance to work (i.e., it was repealed 
before having an effect). The removal of the regulatory provision was not because of its 
failed practical impact, but rather it was politically convenient for a government seeking 
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to secure support for other reforms.9  In addition, Spanish initial approval of mandatory 
auditor rotation in 1988 could reflect regulators’ self-interest, e.g., extending regulation 
power (Stigler 1971).10  Moreover, regulators appear to ignore the information role 
played by the stock market.  If the findings of empirical studies that auditor tenure 
increases audit quality are justifiable, then the results of Ghosh and Moon (2005) that the 
market rewards auditor tenure positively imply that the stock market is efficient and can 












                                                 
 
 
9 In fact, the Spanish government considered the proposals for the re-introduction of mandatory auditor 
rotation of auditors from March 2002 that require auditor firm rotation every 12 years for listed companies. 
The eventual outcome was mandatory rotation of the audit partner and the audit team every seven years.  
10 In 1971, George Stigler published his seminal article, "The Theory of Economic Regulation". He presented and gave 
evidence for his "capture theory." Stigler argued that governments do not end up creating monopoly in industries by 
accident.  Rather, he wrote, they regulate at the behest of producers who "capture" the regulatory agency and use 





AUDITOR TENURE AND ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM  
 
4.1 Concept of Accounting Conservatism 
Conservatism has been an important attribute in accounting practice, which is 
traditionally expressed as “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses” (Bliss 1924, 
pg.110).  Anticipating profits means recording profits before there is legal claim to their 
associated future cash flows and before the revenues are verifiable (Watts 2003a).  
Financial Accounting Standards Boards (FASB) Statement of Concepts No.2 justifies this 
behavior by defining conservatism as “a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure 
that uncertainties and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered” 
(FASB 1980, pg.36).  Many interpret this as traditional guidance for choosing between 
different methods of accounting for similar transactions.  Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield 
(2001, pg. #50) state “conservatism means when in doubt choose the solution that will be 
least likely to overstate assets and income.” 
In the recent academic literature, Basu (1997) interprets conservatism as representing 
the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good 
news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses.  In other words, conservatism can be 
defined as accountants’ asymmetric recognition of unrealized gains and losses in reported 
earnings.  Building on this interpretation, Basu (1997) posits that accountants recognize 
bad news in earnings more quickly than good news.  Thus, if we assume that current 
equity returns efficiently incorporate good and bad news about firms’ expected future 
cash flows, we expect that the slope coefficient and R2 in a regression of earnings on 
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unexpected returns is higher for firms with negative unexpected returns (proxy for “bad 
news”) than for those with positive unexpected returns (proxy for “good news”).  The 
empirical results from Basu (1997) are consistent with this prediction.  Basu’s measures 
have been used in numerous studies to assess the extent of accounting conservatism 
(Givoly and Hayn 2000, Ball et al. 2000, 2003, Chaney and Philipich 2003, Krishnan 
2003a, Francis et al. 2004, etc.) 
Given the importance of the accounting conservatism principle in accounting 
practice, it is crucial to understand the difference and the inherent association between the 
traditional concept of accounting conservatism and the asymmetry of recognition 
presented by Basu (1997).  Because the literature is very recent, the terminology is 
inconsistent across studies.  The traditional conservatism is called ex ante conservatism 
(Giner and Rees 2001, Pope and Walker 2002, Richardson and Tinaikar 2004), news-
independent conservatism (Chandra et al. 2004) or unconditional conservatism (Ryan and 
Zarowin 2003, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, 2006, Beaver and Ryan 2005).  Basu’s 
concept of conservatism is called ex post conservatism (Richardson and Tinaikar 2004), 
news-dependent conservatism (Chandra et al. 2004), or conditional conservatism (Beaver 
and Ryan 2005, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, 2006).  I will use the terminology of 
unconditional and conditional conservatism throughout this study.  
Unconditional conservatism stems from the application of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) or policies that reduce earnings independent of current 
economic news, meaning that aspects of the accounting process determined at the time of 
acquisition of assets and liabilities yield expected undervalued assets.  Examples of 
unconditional conservatism include immediate expensing of the costs of most internally 
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developed intangibles, accelerated depreciation of property, plant, and equipment, and 
historical cost accounting for positive net present value projects.  As noted in Basu 
(1997), since unconditional conservatism is independent of current-period news, it will 
lower the intercept in a regression of earnings on returns but not affect the slope 
coefficient.  That is, the implementation of unconditional conservatism will not have an 
impact on the relation between earnings and returns in the current period. 
 Conditional conservatism, on the other hand, implies an asymmetric recognition 
of bad news relative to good news: that is, book values are written down under 
sufficiently adverse circumstances but not written up under favorable circumstances.  
Examples of conditional conservatism include the lower of cost or market accounting rule 
for inventory, impairment accounting for long-lived tangible and intangible assets, and 
the asymmetric recognition of contingent losses and contingent gains.  Thus, if the 
market is efficient such that good and bad news are impounded quickly and completely in 
equity prices, the application of conditional conservatism will lead to the slope 
coefficient in the regression of earnings on current returns being higher for firms with 
negative unexpected returns (proxy for bad news) than for those with positive unexpected 
returns (proxy for good news).  
Confusion between the unconditional and conditional versions of conservatism helps 
explain why conservatism is a controversial property of accounting, despite its long-
standing influence on practice (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).11  Evidence of ambivalence 
can also be seen in APB Statement No.4, which appears to approve conservatism in its 




 Basu (1997) cites evidence of conservatism in accounting as early as the beginning of the fifteenth 
century.  
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unconditional version (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 1970, 
para.171). “Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of significant 
uncertainties.  Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally preferred 
that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than 
overstatement of net income and net assets…” 
 Later on, however, the FASB seems to disapprove the concept above, since it cites 
the unconditional version disapprovingly.  “The convention of conservatism, which was 
once commonly expressed as ‘anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses’, developed 
during a time when balance sheets were considered the prime (and often only) financial 
statement, and details of profits or other operating results were rarely provided…” (FASB 
1980, para. 93) 
It is recognized that under both definitions of conservatism, ceteris paribus, higher 
expense and lower income lead to lower reported equity because of the connection 
between the balance sheet and income statement.12,13 Empirical research thus far has 
provided valuable insights into the nature and implications of both types of conservatism.  
The literature on unconditional conservatism puts greater emphasis on the difficulty of 
valuing certain types of economic assets and liabilities and determining their effects on 
                                                 
 
 
12 However, it is useful to realize that balance sheet conservatism and income statement conservatism do 
not always proceed hand in hand (Basu 2001). For example, under the pooling-of-interest method for 
mergers, the acquired firm’s assets and liabilities are recorded on the acquirer’s balance sheet at the values 
on the acquired firm’s balance sheet, and the depreciation rate typically continues as before. However, 
under the purchase method, the assets and liabilities of the acquired firms are recorded at the fair market 
values, which are typically larger than their book values, and later on depreciation rates are also higher than 
those previously used by the acquired firm. Thus, the pooling method leads to more conservative balance 
sheets and less conservative income statements than the purchase method.  
13 The relationship holds under ‘clean surplus’ accounting (Peasnell 1982, Ohlson 1988, Feltham and Ohlson 1995), 
which implies that the firm’s accounting income equals fiscal-year change in book value of equity, adjusted for 
dividends and capital contributions.  
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future income, while the literature on conditional conservatism puts greater weight on 
improving contracting efficiency given managers’ incentives to report more aggressively 
on the income statement and/or balance sheet.  Because of different emphases, the 
literatures on the two types of conservatism have been largely separate.14   
Only recently have researchers begun to study the interaction between the two types 
of conservatism.  For example, Basu (2001) notes that less conservative news-unrelated 
accounting allocation methods are more likely to result in asset writedowns, and hence, 
greater asymmetric news-driven conservatism.  In particular, assets will be written down 
when current market values are lower than their carrying book values.  Similarly, the 
application of the lower-of-cost-or-market rule is more likely to arise when companies 
adopt first-in first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting than when they adopt last-in first-out 
(LIFO) inventory accounting.  Pope and Walker (2002) also mention that unconditional 
conservatism limits the degree of expected conditional conservatism because in the 
extreme case, if assets have not been recognized, then no impairment of their economic 
values can be recognized in accounting income.  Giner and Rees (2001) provide evidence 
of an interaction between unconditional conservatism and conditional conservatism by 
investigating conservatism across Germany, the UK, and France.  Under the news-
independent definition of conservatism (i.e., unconditional conservatism), Germany has 
historically enjoyed a reputation as the most conservative country of the three, followed 
by France and then the UK (Gray 1980, Joos and Lang 1994).  However, Giner and Rees 
(2001) find that under the asymmetric news-dependent definition (i.e., conditional 
                                                 
 
 
14 It is also partly because the conditioned conservatism literature is much newer than unconditional 
conservatism literature. 
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conservatism), the UK is found to be the most conservative and Germany the least 
conservative. 
Basu (2001) points out that the interaction between different conservatism definitions 
provides an interesting insight on whether conservatism has increased over time in the 
U.S.  For example, Bowen et al. (1995) find that during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
companies exhibited large shifts from more conservative accounting choices, such as 
accelerated depreciation and LIFO, to less conservative choices, such as straight-line 
depreciation and FIFO.  In contrast, Givoly and Hayn (2000) rely on measures of 
asymmetric conservatism and find that conservatism has increased over time.  It is 
obvious that these conflicting results on conservatism over time can be reconciled by the 
negative relation between the two types of conservatism definitions.  Further, the 
empirical results of Giner and Rees (2001) and Pope and Walker (2002) show that the 
degree of asymmetry in the recognition of bad news and good news is higher when 
unrecorded goodwill is relatively low, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity 
over the book value of equity.  Pae et al. (2005) also report similar results.  These 
findings suggest that any comparison of asymmetric earnings timeliness should consider 
the interaction between unconditional conservatism and conditional conservatism.   
Beaver and Ryan (2005) develop a general model of conditional and unconditional 
conservatism under uncertainty.  The model captures the fact that unconditional 
conservatism is a primary source of unrecorded goodwill, which constitutes a form of 
“accounting slack” that preempts the application of conditional conservatism unless news 
is sufficiently bad to use up that slack.  In other words, unconditional conservatism is 
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determined at the acquisition of assets and liabilities and so precedes conditional 
conservatism.  
 Accounting conservatism has been observed for centuries, although there is 
significant controversy regarding whether conservatism is a desirable accounting 
attribute.15  Giner and Rees (2001) point out that conservatism should not be viewed as a 
necessarily desirable or undesirable characteristic.  Ball et al. (2000) hypothesize that the 
demand for conservatism is universal in that accountants and auditors find negative 
information from managers more credible than good news, stakeholders are more 
concerned about receiving bad news promptly than good news, and regulators also are 
concerned about rapidly identifing problem areas.  Christensen and Demski (2004) 
develop a model with a principal-agent setting and show that users of financial statements 
demand more information when a manager claims good news instead of bad news (i.e., 
asymmetric monitoring).   
Watts (2003a) summarizes and categorizes four explanations for conservative 
reporting, all of which suggest that accounting conservatism benefits users of financial 
reports.  First, conservative reporting arises because it is a necessary and efficient 
mechanism employed in firms and their contracts with various parties to avoid the moral 
hazard problem caused by information asymmetry.  This contracting explanation suggests 
                                                 
 
 
15 Many capital market regulators and standard setters in the U.S. favor neutrality over conservatism (see FASB 1980, 
para. 91-97, Levitt 1998). In contrast, the International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) regards conservatism 
as one of the core features of high-quality accounting. In 1989, IASC approved the Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements. Instead of using ‘conservatism’, the framework describes uncertainties in the 
reliability of financial statements associated with items recognized and measured in financial statements as ‘prudence’, 
which is “… the inclusion of a degree of caution in the exercise of the judgments needed in making the estimates 




that conservatism can constrain managerial opportunistic behavior and offset managerial 
biases in asset valuation, which, in turn, increases the firm value shared among all parties.  
Second, asymmetric litigation costs in valuing a firm’s net assets motivate conservative 
reporting in that undervaluing net assets is less likely to induce litigation costs than 
overvaluing net assets.  Third, conservative reporting generates tax benefits in that 
delaying the recognition of revenues and accelerating the recognition of expenses defers 
tax payments.  Lastly, conservatism has always been of interest and concern to regulators 
since conservatism reduces the political cost imposed by standard setters and regulators 
as well.  Taken together, Watts (2003a) contends that both types of conservatism are 
likely to improve contracting efficiency because they represent bonding or 
recommitments by agents (Basu 2005).  In contrast, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) argue 
that unconditional conservatism cannot increase debt and governance contracting 
efficiency because it does not cause financial statements to incorporate any information 
that was unknown at the time of contracting.  However, timely loss recognition, 
conditional on a firm incurring economic losses, causes managers to act on the losses 
more quickly.  They conclude that unconditional conservatism seems inefficient or at best 
neutral in contracting.  
In addition, historical evidence suggests that most forms of unconditional 
conservatism arose from tax and regulatory incentives.  For example, one of the primary 
motives to adopt LIFO and conservative depreciation methods is to minimize corporate 
income taxes.  However, regardless of the role in contracting efficiency, the two types of 
conservatism capture investors’ and others’ perceived asymmetric loss functions, 
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minimizing firms’ litigation, tax, or regulatory costs, and finally, could provide benefit to 
all users of accounting numbers (Beaver and Ryan 2005).  
Conservatism is an important property in accounting income.  Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006) argue that conditional conservatism (the asymmetry) is an important determinant 
of earnings quality, improving the usefulness of financial statements generally, and more 
specifically in the contexts of corporate governance, management compensation and debt 
contacting.  Differences in the demand for accounting income in different institutional 
contexts, however, cause this property (i.e., conservatism) to vary internationally.  Ball et 
al. (2000) examine the difference in conservatism between common law countries (e.g., 
U.S., U.K.) and code law countries (e.g., Germany, Japan).  They argue that in code law 
countries, the comparatively strong political influence on accounting drives the demand 
for accounting income influenced more by the payout preferences of agents for labor, 
capital and the government, while in common law countries, the ‘shareholder’ 
governance model determines that the public disclosure market plays an important role in 
the desirable properties of accounting income.  They hypothesize and find that 
accounting income in common law countries more quickly incorporates economic losses 
(income conservatism) than in code law countries.16   
In another study by Ball et al. (2003), the authors argue that the classification of 
countries by accounting standards (e.g., from common law sources vs. from code law 
sources) is not appropriate because financial reporting practice under a given set of 
                                                 
 
 
16 The underlying premise is that a country’s legal system creates incentives that influence the behavior of 
corporate executives, investors, regulators and other market participants. Such incentives shape the 
properties of reported accounting numbers through a complex interplay of accounting standards, legal, 
regulatory, and political pressures (Bushman and Piotroski 2006). 
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standards is sensitive to the incentives of the managers and auditors responsible for 
financial statement preparation and verification.  They show that although the accounting 
standards in the East Asian countries, including Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand, derive from common law countries (U.K., U.S., and International Accounting 
Standards (IAS)), their financial reporting is not more conservative (e.g., timely 
recognition of economic losses) than those under code law.  Basu et al. (2005) find 
similar results for firms in Taiwan.  The reason is that institutional structures including 
market and political forces in those five East Asian countries, which profoundly affect 
financial reporting practice, can be characterized as variants of the code law model. 
Among the few countries that require mandatory auditor rotation or had required but 
later on dropped it, Canada is the only common law county based on both accounting 
standards and preparers’ incentives.  That is, Italy, Spain, South Korea, Austria, Brazil, 
Singapore, and India are classified as code law countries that are found to have lower 
reporting quality with respect to accounting conservatism.17 Given the fact that in code 
law countries, preparers’ incentives predominantly originate from political forces (Ball et 
al. 2003), the enforcement of mandatory auditor rotation in those countries is more likely 
to reflect the incentives of government or other regulators instead of public shareholders.  
 
4.2 Audit Quality and Accounting Conservatism 
                                                 
 
 
17 The classification of Italy, Spain, South Korea, Austria and Brazil into code law countries is consistent 
with the study by La Porta et al. (2000) and Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Based on Ball et al. (2003), I 
classify India as a code law country, because like Singapore, it has accounting standards from common law 
but has incentives similar to code law countries.   
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Auditors play an important role in determining the earnings quality of financial 
statements.  Prior studies suggest one reason for accounting conservatism is auditors’ 
liability exposure to shareholder lawsuits.  Kothari et al. (1988) document that the legal 
liability exposure of auditors and managers has increased significantly over the last three 
decades.  Conservatism reduces auditors’ liability exposure and causes auditors to 
increase the asymmetric timeliness of earnings in recognizing economic losses.  Basu 
(1997) and Basu et al. (2001a) find that earnings are more timely in recognizing bad news 
in periods of high auditor liability exposure, consistent with auditors being more 
conservative when exposed to greater legal liability.   
DeAngelo (1981b) argues that audit firm size could be a surrogate of audit quality.  
Thus, big audit firms are expected to provide high quality earnings in financial statements.  
Consistent with this argument, Basu et al. (2001b) show that the earnings reported by big 
auditees are more conservative than the earnings of non-big auditees.18  Furthermore, 
Krishnan (2007) shows that earnings conservatism has increased for former Andersen 
clients of its Houston office that switched to a Big 4 auditor.  All of these results suggest 
that Big 4 auditors and managers use earnings conservatism as a risk management 
strategy. 
Audit firms can maintain higher reported audit quality by demanding more 
conservative earnings for their clients even under the ‘threat’ of auditor independence.  
Ruddock et al. (2006) find that nonaudit services provided by audit firms in Australia do 
                                                 
 
 
18 However, the association between audit firm size and audit quality may not apply to Arthur Andersen, in 
particular, Houston office. For example, Krishnan (2005a) reports that earnings of Andersen clients of its 
Houston office were less timely in reporting bad news about future cash flows relative to a control group 
audited by other big audit firms. 
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not impair auditor independence because the extent to which earnings reflect bad news is 
statistically similar across firms with high or low nonaudit fees.  Li (2006) finds that 
earnings more quickly reflect bad news for clients with large economic influence, which 
again implies that auditors report more conservatively to mitigate their legal liability 
exposure.  
In sum, empirical studies are consistent with auditors being conservative, especially 
when exposed to greater legal liability.  Recent empirical studies find that auditors are 
more conservative after the passage of SOX (Krishnan 2007, Ahmed et al. 2006, Li 2006). 
The current study will link auditor tenure to accounting conservatism, as discussed in the 
next section.  
 
4.3 Auditor Tenure and Accounting Conservatism 
Givoly et al. (2007) offer a classification of the sources of conservatism, which they 
define as the systematic understatement of assets on the balance sheet.  For illustration, I 
reproduce Appendix C of their study as Appendix A in this paper.  In the first column, 
three sources of understatement are identified: C1, conservatism arising from financial 
accounting’s failure to capture the positive present value of projects and subsequent 
increases in the value of assets (i.e., historical cost accounting); C2, conservatism 
resulting from minimization of the firm’s assets as reported on the balance sheet; and C3, 
conservatism due to the asymmetric recognition of losses relative to gains.  The second 
column documents the features of financial reporting that contribute to the three sources 
of conservatism, while the last two columns point out the extent of discretion available to 
standard setters, regulators and management with respect to each aspect of conservatism.  
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The classification of conservatism sources C1 and C2 is consistent with unconditional 
conservatism, while C3 refers to conditional conservatism.  Thus, the combination of the 
historical cost convention, the choices of accounting methods and estimates within this 
convention, and the asymmetric recognition rules for losses relative to gains yield a 
conservative valuation of assets and equity (Givoly et al. 2007).19   
Consistent with prior studies, this study examines the effect of auditor tenure on 
conditional accounting conservatism.  Most of the prior research focuses on this version 
of conservatism because unconditional conservatism is argued to be difficult to test 
empirically since accounting choices could be driven by economically different asset 
investment and usage patterns (Basu 1995), are often stable within short periods (e.g., 
LIFO vs. FIFO), and because unconditional conservatism is claimed to lack contracting 
efficiency (Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  In addition, as discussed earlier, the literature 
appears to establish a negative correlation between unconditional and conditional 
conservatism (Giner and Rees 2001, Basu 2001, Pope and Walker 2002, Beaver and 
Ryan 2005).  Hence, it is not necessary to investigate the predicted impact of auditor 
tenure on both types of conservatism.   
Regulators are concerned that long-term interaction between the auditor and client 
can impair auditor independence and reduce audit quality.  Long-term audit revenue 
generated from current clients seemingly serves as an annuity for audit firms.  In addition, 
auditors need subsequent years of work to recover their initial ‘investment losses’ arising 
from the practice of ‘lowballing’ in initial audit engagements (DeAngelo 1981a, Dye 
                                                 
 
 
19 Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) emphasize that the non-recognition of firm-level rents constitutes a 
distinct type of conservatism from the perspective of understatement of the value of net assets.  
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1991, Lee and Gu 1998, Zang 1999).  Thus, auditors might attempt to obtain long-term 
relationships with their clients by acquiescing to management’s reporting decisions.  
Consequently, the likelihood of auditors’ compromising their independence might 
increase as auditor tenure lengthens.  The extent of impairment to auditor independence 
also depends on auditors’ other considerations, including reputation, litigation risk, and 
the economic importance of clients.   
The potential reduced auditor independence due to long-term relationships with 
clients can decrease the extent of accounting conservatism.  First, as shown in Appendix 
A, GAAP provides discretion to management as to when unrealized losses must be 
recognized.  That is, even though management records expected losses less quickly, they 
are still in compliance with GAAP.  During initial audits, the unfamiliarity between 
auditors and clients are more likely to drive auditors to behave strictly according to both 
GAAP and the conservative reporting convention in accounting due to the concern of 
uncertain litigation risk.  However, as the auditor-client relationship grows, auditors are 
more familiar with and confident in various risks associated with the client.  Thus, they 
may confer more discretion to allow management to report less conservatively.  Second, 
after a company survives in the market for a long time, it is possible that conservative 
reporting fades in that the closeness with other contracting parties that have known the 
company well might produce a similar reduced alertness towards management.  This is 
not to say that accounting conservatism becomes less important, but that under current 
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GAAP, conservatism is more or less ‘voluntary’, so that without the monitoring, 
management would tend toward more aggressive reporting behavior.20    
There may be competing potential effects of the auditor-client relationship on 
accounting conservatism in the early stages of audit engagements.  In particular, newly 
appointed auditors lack sufficient knowledge about the client firm’s business operations 
and internal control systems; thus, auditors with less competence have to rely more on 
managers’ decisions in financial reporting and consequently, are more likely to acquiesce 
to managers’ opportunistic behavior, reducing the level of accounting conservatism.  On 
the other hand, it is possible that the unfamiliarity with clients will raise auditors’ 
alertness toward audit work to avoid potential audit risk.  For instance, they may be likely 
to increase sampling tests or even report more conservatively for some transactions.  In 
contrast, a long auditor-client relationship produces increasing “familiarity” with each 
other, which might reduce auditor independence.  In addition, the auditors’ overtrust of 
management after long-time cooperation more likely has become subconscious (Moore 
and Loewenstein 2004).  In other words, individual partners do not realize that tight 
relations with the client impair their objectivity.  This leads to reduced accounting 
conservatism without regard to the level of accounting conservatism at the early stages of 
the engagement.  Hence, this study forms its main hypothesis as follows:  
 
                                                 
 
 
20 The argument of divergence in interest between corporate owners and management can be traced back to an earlier 
study by Berle and Means (1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) integrate agency theory and corporate finance to explain 
why an entrepreneur or manager (agent) in a firm will choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of 
the firm is less than it would be if he were the sole owner, and why this failure to maximize the value of the firm is 
perfectly consistent with efficiency.   
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Hypothesis 1:  Conditional accounting conservatism, arising from asymmetric timely 
loss recognition relative to gain recognition, will decrease as auditor tenure lengthens. 
 
Admitting that long-time working with clients also likely increases auditors’ client-
specific knowledge and skills, which in turn increases conservatism, causes the 
association between auditor tenure and accounting conservatism to potentially end up 
with a zero or even positive effect.  Certainly, a zero effect can arise when in fact, there is 
no relation between auditor tenure and conservatism, while variation of conservatism 
level could be driven by other firm-specific characteristics.   
Jenkins and Velury (2006) find evidence of a positive association between auditor 
tenure and accounting conservatism (i.e., asymmetric loss recognition) using the Basu 
(1997) model.  However, their research design is subject to several important limitations.  
In particular, first, they examine publicly listed firms in the U.S. from 1983 to 2004 
during which time accounting practices changed greatly.  For example, Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) report that the timeliness of earnings to reflect bad news relative to good news 
was increasing from the 1950s to the 1990s, with the highest level at the end of 1990s.  In 
addition, most sample firms will have longer auditor-client durations at the end of the 
1990s.  Consequently, the results of Jenkins and Velury (2006) might be driven by the 
prevalent pattern of changes in accounting conservatism, namely, increasing conditional 
accounting conservatism, instead of the effect of long auditor tenure.   
Second, Jenkins and Velury (2006) do not control for many other potential factors 
which might play an important role in determining the level of conservatism.  In other 
words, the observed association between auditor tenure and conditional conservatism 
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could be due to the factors that are not controlled for.  For example, large firms are more 
likely to be associated with more accounting conservatism because large firms have 
greater exposure of litigation risks and more information asymmetry (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005, LaFond and Watts 2006).  Moreover, the firms with long auditor 
tenure could be those with good performance that survive in serious market competition.  
The larger firm size would be an important feature for those firms.  In addition, Ahmed et 
al. (2002), Watts (2003a) and Ball et al. (2005) stress that debt contracting increases the 
demand for accounting conservatism, and conversely, conservative reporting mitigates 
the agency costs arising from information asymmetry between debt holders and 
management (LaFond and Watts 2006).  This implies that the differences associated with 
debt contracting among different firms could produce heterogeneous demand for 
accounting conservatism.  Hence, without considering the potential effect of omitted 
firms’ important characteristics on accounting conservatism, the findings of Jenkins and 
Velury (2006) are inconclusive.  
 Third, the research design in Jenkins and Velury (2006) explicitly assumes that it 
is the auditor’s choice to decide the length of association with the client.  However, we 
know that the length of auditor-client relationship is the product of mutual interaction 
between auditors and their clients, rather than of any single party.  On one hand, 
incumbent auditors certainly have their own option to decide whether they will continue 
the audits with current clients.  This decision could be based on the consideration of the 
reasons for discontinuance and the impact of losing the client.  On the other hand, 
management also has discretion on retaining the incumbent auditor, the decision of which 
could be based on company strategies or the cost of potential litigation risk.  Thus, a 
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simple regression model with auditor tenure as an exogenous explanatory variable 
ignores the fact that auditor tenure is a mutual decision between auditors and companies, 










5.1 Measures of Accounting Conditional Conservatism  
5.1.1 Timeliness of Earnings to Reflect ‘News’  
Asymmetric recognition of economic losses indicates that earnings reflect ‘bad 
news’ more quickly than ‘good news’.  Because stock prices reflect information received 
from sources other than current earnings, stock prices lead accounting earnings by up to 
four years (Ball and Brown 1968, Beaver et al. 1980, Kothari and Sloan 1992), and thus, 
stock returns can be used as a proxy for ‘news’.  In a piecewise-linear regression with 
market-adjusted stock returns as the independent variable and current-year accounting 
income as the dependent variable, as shown in model (1), the timeliness of earnings is 
inferred from the responsiveness of accounting income to the change in market values.  
The use of fiscal-year returns implies that there is no gap in calendar time between 
successive return intervals, which makes the test map into value relevance tests (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005).  Negative market-adjusted stock returns are used as a proxy for bad 
news and positive returns as a proxy for good news. 
NIit = α0 + α1DRit +α2Rit +α3Rit * DRit + ε                      (1) 
where 
NIit    = net income before extraordinary items reported in period t divided by beginning  
of fiscal year total assets;  
DRit   = 1 if market-adjusted return for firm i during year t is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
and      
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Rit    = market-adjusted annual stock return for firm i at the fiscal year-end t. 
The extent of timeliness with annual earnings as the dependent variable is measured 
by the slope coefficient, α2, and overall explanatory power, R
2, in this regression model 
(Beaver et al. 1980).  The asymmetric recognition of economic losses relative to gains 
(i.e., conditional conservatism) is captured by the coefficient α3.  I test the main 
hypothesis by developing the following operational hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Firms’ timeliness of earnings to unexpected negative returns (“bad 
news”) decreases as auditor tenure increases. 
 
To examine hypothesis H1a, auditor tenure (TENURE) is calculated by the number 
of years since the auditors have been employed.  To mitigate the possibility of nonlinear 
relation between auditor tenure and conservatism, I also classify observations into three 
groups to compare the conservatism, where short (medium) (long) auditor tenure group 
contains firms with auditor tenure less than or equal to three years (less than or equal to 
eight years but greater than or equal to four years) (greater than or equal to nine years).21  
As a sensitivity test, I also use various other cutoffs for short, medium, or long auditor 
tenure.  As shown in model (2), I include the additional intercept and interactive slope 
coefficients to capture the incremental power of longer auditor tenure: 
                                                 
 
 
21 Prior research does not provide consistent definitions of long-tenure and short-tenure. The way to classify 
tenure used in this study is consistent with Johnson et al. (2002). Stanley and DeZoort (2007) define 
auditor-client relationship with longer than or equal to five years as long-tenure and less than or equal to 
three years as short-tenure. 
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NIit  = α0 + α1DRit + α2Rit + α3Rit * DRit + α4TENUREit + α5DRit * TENUREit 
+ α6Rit * TENUREit + α7Rit * DRit * TENUREit                (2) 
 
where  
TENUREit = the number of years since the auditors have been employed for firm i at 
fiscal year-end t; and  
other variables are as previously defined. 
If longer auditor tenure adversely affects audit quality (that is, leading to decreased 
auditor conservatism), then the coefficient for α7 is expected to be significantly negative, 
which indicates that longer auditor tenure will cause lower incremental timeliness of 
earnings to reflect bad news than shorter auditor tenure. 
5.1.2 Persistence of Earnings Changes 
Although empirical research has widely used the approach of Basu (1997) (e.g., 
asymmetric recognition of losses) for tests of conditional conservatism, the application 
and interpretation of model (2) needs caution.  Gigler and Hemmer (2001) develop a 
model of the relation between biases in financial reporting and managers’ incentives to 
issue timely voluntary disclosures.  They find that firms with relatively more 
conservative accounting are less likely to make timely voluntary disclosures than firms 
with less conservative accounting.  Hence, contemporaneous stock returns more quickly 
reflect the news for firms with less conservative accounting.22   
                                                 
 
 
22 Dietrich et al. (2007) argue that the interpretation of model (1) is valid only when the market is efficient; 
in particular, if market returns cause earnings, and not the reverse. Ryan (2006) notes that two well-known 
empirical results, the low R2s observed in contemporaneous returns-earnings regressions (Collins et al. 
1997, Ely and Waymire 1999, Francis and Schipper 1999) and a large literature showing that returns 
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Mindful of these issues, I use a second approach based on another test of conditional 
conservatism in Basu (1997), namely, lower persistence of negative earnings changes.  
Basu (1997) shows that conservatism results in the lower persistence of earnings in bad 
news periods relative to good news periods.  Thus, asymmetric timeliness, as discussed 
above, and asymmetric persistence are different ways to measure the same phenomenon, 
accounting conservatism.  More persistence means that less current value relevant news 
is reported in current earnings, and more of it will be reported in future earnings.  The 
deferred recognition of relatively good news results in positive changes in income being 
less likely to reverse than negative earnings changes.  That is because from a time series 
perspective, the bad news reflected in current earnings will appear as a transitory shock in 
the earnings process, while in contrast, the effects of a current positive shock will be 
spread over several future periods’ earnings as anticipated gains are realized (Basu 1997).  
Thus, positive earnings changes repeat more often than negative earnings changes.  The 
following model from Basu (1997) is used to estimate this relation: 
∆NIit = β0 +β1 D∆NIit-1 +β2∆NI it-1 +β3D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 + ε        (3) 
where  
∆NIit    = change in net income before extraordinary items for firm i in fiscal year t 
deflated by beginning-of-year total assets; 
∆NI it-1  = change in net income for firm i in fiscal year t-1 deflated by beginning-of-year 
total assets; and 
D∆NIit-1= 1 if ∆NI it-1< 0, and 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
typically reflect information on a timelier basis than earnings, indicate that the concern mentioned by 
Dietrich et al. is likely to induce very tiny bias in the estimation of conservatism. 
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Timely recognition of economic losses implies that they are recognized as transitory 
income decreases, and hence reverse in the next period, leading to a negative value of β3.  
The less negative β3, the more that conservatism is decreasing.  Thus, the main hypothesis 
can be examined by testing the second operational hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  The reversal of current negative earnings changes in the next period 
will be slower as auditor tenure increases. 
 
To test hypothesis H1b, auditor tenure (TENURE) is included in model (3) as an 
interacting variable, as shown in model (4).  
∆NIit = β0 +β1 D∆NIit-1 + β2∆NI it-1 + β3D∆NI it-1*∆NI it-1 + β4TENUREit 
 + β5D∆NI it-1* TENUREit + β6∆NI it-1* TENUREit  
+ β7D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 * TENUREit + ε                                        (4) 
 
where all variables are as previously defined. 
I have no hypotheses concerning the difference of different auditor tenure in gain 
recognition, so I offer no prediction on the incremental tenure coefficient on earnings 
increases, β6.  If longer auditor tenure adversely affects audit quality, resulting in reduced 
conservatism, then the coefficient for β7 is expected to be significantly positive, which 
indicates that firms with a longer client-auditor relationship have a reduced tendency of 
negative earnings changes to reverse in the following period.   
 
5.2 Control for Additional Sources of Conservatism 
Conservatism can be measured by the Basu coefficient and/or the ratio of the market 
value of equity to the book value of equity (MB).  The asymmetric recognition of losses 
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and gains, captured by the Basu coefficient, is a measure of accounting conditional 
conservatism that generates the understatement of net assets, which is conditional 
economic income.  Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) argue that market returns can 
incorporate information about unbooked items, such as growth options and synergies, 
that cannot generate accrued gains or losses, financial statement-based “booked” 
variables.  They also suggest that the Basu measure, compared to the MB ratio is a better 
measure of conservatism when estimated cumulatively over several periods.  Ryan (2006) 
claims that the extent to which the MB ratio exceeds one is perhaps the most natural way 
to assess overall conservatism (conditional and unconditional conservatism).  In addition, 
LaFond and Watts (2006) argue that the greater a firm’s growth options, the greater is the 
information asymmetry between equity investors in the firm, which leads to more 
conservatism.  Thus, to control for growth options, not captured by the Basu coefficient, I 
include the book to market ratio (BM) in multivariate regressions testing incremental 
association between auditor tenure and conditional conservatism.23  
Accounting history is consistent with debt contracting being a major contracting 
influence on conservatism (Watts 1993, 2003a, 2003b, Ball et al. 2005).  Different debt 
levels can reflect distinct demands for asymmetric timeliness of earnings.  Loan 
agreements transfer decision rights to lenders conditional on adverse but not favorable 
outcomes, which generates higher demand of timely recognition of losses than of gains 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2006).  Moreover, managers have incentives to disclose good news 
to potential lenders, thus, lenders are less likely to demand timely gain recognition in the 
                                                 
 
 
23 The use of BM ratio instead of MB ratio can avoid the exclusion of firms with negative book value of 
equity.  
 48 
financial statements.  Accordingly, consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and 
LaFond and Watts (2006), I use LEV (the leverage ratio) to proxy for the debt contract 
demand for conservatism. 
Prior studies suggest that litigation risk may also be a source of conservatism (Beaver 
1993, Watts 1993) since litigation is more likely when the financial statements are 
overstated.  Basu (1997) finds that accounting conservatism increases in periods where 
auditors’ legal liability exposure increases.  Hence, consistent with LaFond and Watts 
(2006), I measure auditors’ litigation risk by using the parameters from Shu (2000) that 
develops a measure of auditor litigation risk.  According to Shu’s logit model, the 
auditors’ litigation risk exposure (LIGA) is calculated as the probability of auditor 
litigation for each firm-year observation in my sample.  
Lastly, firm size is also expected to be related to conservatism.  Giner and Rees 
(2001), Basu et al. (2001a, 2001b) and LaFond and Watts (2006) find that small firms are 
more asymmetrically conservative than large firms.  Higher conservatism associated with 
small firms could arise from more volatile returns in small firms, making them more 
likely to have material economic impairments, and hence, exposing their auditors and 
managers to greater legal liability risk.  As a consequence, auditors tend to be harsher on 
their small clients (Carcello and Neal, 2000).  Other possible explanations include less 
diversified operations in small firms or ex-ante income decreasing methods to preserve 
their access to costly debt capital (Basu 2001).  Therefore, I include firm size (SIZE), 
measured as the natural log of a firm’s market value of equity at the end of the estimation 
period.   
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Taken together, to mitigate the concern that the association between auditor tenure 
and conservatism is due to other source-based demands for conservatism, I include BM, 
LEV, LIGA and SIZE as interactive variables, as shown in model (5) and (6): 
 
NIit = α0 + α1DRit + α2Rit + α3Rit * DRit + α4TENUREit + α5DRit * TENUREit  
+ α6Rit * TENURE + α7Rit * DRit * TENUREit + α8BM +α9DRit * BM it  
+ α10 Rit * BM + α11Rit * DRit * BM it  + α12LEV it + α13DRit * LEV it  
+ α14Rit * LEVit + α15Rit * DRit * LEVit + α16LIGAit + α17DRit * LIGAit 
+ α18 Rit * LIGAit + α19Rit * DRit * LIGAit + α20SIZEit + α21DRit * SIZEit  
+ α22Rit * SIZEit + α23Rit * DRit * SIZEit + ε                                     (5) 
 
∆NIit  = β0 +β1 D∆NIit-1 + β2∆NI it-1 + β3D∆NI it-1*∆NI it-1 + β4TENUREit  
+ β5D∆NIit-1* TENUREit + β6∆NI it-1* TENUREit  
+ β7D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 * TENUREit + β8BMit + β9D∆NIit-1* BMit  
+ β10∆NI it-1* BMit +β11D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 * BMit + β12LEVit 
+ β13D∆NIit-1* LEVit + β14∆NI it-1* LEVit + β15D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 * LEVit 
+ β16LIGAit + β17D∆NIit-1* LIGAit + β18∆NI it-1* LIGAit  
+ β19D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 * LIGAit +β20SIZEit + β21D∆NIit-1* SIZEit  
+ β22∆NI it-1* SIZEit + β23D∆NI it-1 *∆NI it-1 * SIZEit + ε                  (6)   
 
where (subscripts are abbreviated) 
BM   = the Book to Market ratio, defined as the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity at the fiscal year-end; 
LEV  = leverage, defined as total debt divided by total assets at the fiscal year-end; 
LIGA  = the probability of auditor litigation, calculated using the parameters from Table 
3 of Shu (2000);  
SIZE  = the natural log of the firm’s market value of equity at the fiscal year-end; and 
all other variables are as previous defined.  
 
5.3 Control for Endogeneity 
The tests above assume that auditor tenure choice is exogenous.  However, if firms 
select auditor tenure based on companies’ own characteristics, then auditor tenure 
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(TENURE) is endogenous.  Therefore, the choice of auditor tenure should be estimated 
simultaneously with models of conservatism.  Consistent with Krishnan (2003a), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and Ruddock et al. (2006), I use the switching simultaneous 
equations model of Lee (1979), which controls for any bias resulting from self-selection 
of auditor tenure (Maddala 1983, Chapter 9).  The standard 2SLS simultaneous equations 
model is inappropriate when the choice variable (i.e., TENURE) is interactive in models 
(2), (4), (5) and (6).  Therefore, I rely on a two-stage “treatment effect” model using the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage approach to estimate the following model (i.e., auditor tenure 
choice equation): 
 
TENUREit =δ0+ δ1SIZEit+ δ2LEVit + δ3INVENTORYit + δ4ARit + δ5CURRENTit  
+ δ6ROAit + δ7TECHit + δ8GROWTHit + δ9RETURNit + δ10BETAit  
+ δ11VOLATILITYit + δ12DLOSS + δ13LASTOPINIONit + δ14OPINIONit  
+ δ15DELISTit + δ16SEGMENTit + δ17FIRMAGE + ε                   (7) 
 
where (subscripts are abbreviated) 
TENURE   = long or medium tenure group is coded as one when compared with short  
tenure group (coded as zero); long tenure group is coded one when 
compared with medium tenure group (coded as zero),  
SIZE          = natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV            = long term debt over total assets; 
Inventory   = inventory divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
AR             = accounts receivable divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal 
year; 
CURRENT  = current assets divided by current liabilities; 
ROA            = net income divided by total assets; 
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TECH         = 1 if a firm’s SIC code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, or between  
3825 and 3839, and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH   = sales growth; 
RETURN    = the compounded annual return over the fiscal year; 
BETA          = the slope coefficient of a regression of daily stock returns on equal-
weighted market returns; 
DLOSS       = 1 if a firm reports negative earnings in the current year or prior year and 0 
otherwise; 
VOLATILITY  = the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year; 
LASTOPINION = 1 if a firm has not received a completely clean opinion from its auditor 
in the last year, and 0 otherwise; 
OPINION      = 1 if a firm has not received a clean opinion from its auditor in the current 
year, and 0 otherwise; 
DELIST       = 1 if firm is delisted because of financial difficulties within the next year, 
and 0 otherwise; 
SEGMENT   = the reported number of business segments; and 
FIRMAGE    = the number of years that the firm has available data in Compustat since 
1950.  
In the first stage, I run a logistic model of auditor tenure choice and use the 
parameters estimated from this model (7) to calculate the inverse Mills ratios (Lambda) 
for all firm-years in the sample.  To estimate auditor tenure choice equation (7), I include 
factors suggested in prior studies that influence auditors’ change, related to both auditor 
resignation and auditor dismissal.  Auditors are more likely to resign from current clients 
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when litigation risk against auditors is high (Shu 2000).  Stice (1991), Lys and Watts 
(1994), Francis et al. (1994), Shu (2000) and Heninger (2001) find that litigation against 
auditors is high when firms have larger size, higher leverage, higher ratios of accounts 
receivable and inventory to lagged total assets, higher stock volatility, worse financial 
condition, and operate in a litigious industry (e.g., high technology industry).  The 
incorporation of the factors capturing client-related risks is consistent with Johnstone 
(2000) and Choi et al. (2004), who show that audit firms consider and screen clients 
based on clients’ risk characteristics.  I include qualified opinions since the events leading 
to qualified audit opinions might also give rise to auditor litigation leading to auditor 
resignation.  Moreover, Lennox (2002) finds that companies strategically dismiss 
incumbent auditors if they are more likely to issue unfavorable audit opinions compared 
to newly appointed auditors.  Thus, qualified audit opinions increase conflict between 
auditors and management, leading to a higher likelihood of either auditor resignation or 
auditor dismissal by management.  The prior fiscal year audit opinions are included as 
well to capture the lagged effect of audit opinions on auditors’ decisions to withdraw.  
I posit that the firms with greater complexity of operations are more likely to 
encounter disagreements between auditors and management in the application of 
accounting methods.  Hence, I use SEGMENT, defined as the number of reported 
business segments in the current fiscal year, to proxy for the complexity of firm 
operations.  GROWTH is used to capture firms’ operating characteristics that are likely to 
expose them to greater accounting measurement application risks (Kinney and McDaniel 
1989).  Furthermore, Ashbaugh et al. (2006) argue that growing firms are more likely to 
expand the complexity of operations.  The increasing complexity might induce more 
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conflicts in accounting decisions between auditors and firms.  Finally, older firms are 
more likely to have longer auditor-client relationships.  Thus, FIRMAGE is included as 
well in model (7).  
In the second stage, regression models (2), (4), (5) and (6) are re-estimated by 
including the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) calculated from model (7) as a control 
variable and allowing its coefficient to vary between firms with long auditor tenure and 
those with short auditor tenure.  The significant value of the coefficient of the inverse 
Mills ratio indicates an endogeneity problem.  If longer auditor tenure adversely affects 
audit quality (that is, leading to decreased auditor conservatism), then the coefficient for 
α7 (β7) is expected to be significantly negative (positive), which indicates that longer 
auditor tenure will cause lower incremental timeliness of earnings to reflect bad news 
(lower tendency of negative earnings changes to reverse) than shorter auditor tenure. 
 
5.4 Additional Measure of Conservatism   
The tests of conditional conservatism based on Basu (1997) are widely applied in the 
accounting literature.24  To further strengthen my tests, I use the model recently 
developed in Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) as the third measure of conservatism, 
referred to as accruals-based loss recognition.   
Accrual-based accounting eliminates transitory effects on cash flows and constructs 
earnings with less noise than cash flow from operations, which implies that accruals and 
                                                 
 
 
24 Basu (1997) is one of the most influential papers in accounting research in the past decade (Ryan 2006). 
It is being cited in over 359 published and working papers as of June 2007 according to Google Scholar. 
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cash flow from operations are contemporaneously negatively correlated (Dechow 1994).  
Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006) incorporate another role for accruals in this relation, 
that is, timely recognition of economic gains and losses (Basu 1997).  They assert a 
positive but asymmetric correlation between accruals and contemporaneous cash flows.  
The positive correlation arises because cash flow revisions in the current period tend to 
be positively correlated with current revisions for expected future cash flows.  
Furthermore, timely recognition of unrealized gains and losses is based on expected, not 
realized cash flows, and therefore accomplished through accruals.  Thus, timely gain and 
loss recognition will produce a positive correlation between accruals and current period 
cash flows.  The correlation is asymmetric because losses, under conservative reporting, 
are more likely to be recognized on a timely basis than gains.25  This is shown in the 
following model: 
ACCit = γ0 + γ1DCFOit + γ2CFOit + γ3CFOit * DCFOit                    (8) 
where:  
ACCit    = Operating income for firm i minus its operating cash flows in year t, deflated 
by total assets in year t-1;                                              
DCFOit   = 1 if operating cash flows for firm i in year t is negative, and 0 otherwise; and 
CFOit     = Operating cash flows in year t for firm i deflated by total assets in year                                                                              
t-1. 
                                                 
 
 
25 Ball and Shivakumar (2006) incorporate conditional conservatism, the asymmetric timeliness with which 
accruals recognize economic losses, into the existing accruals models. The findings contribute to 
accounting research on the role of accruals in conditional conservatism and the specification of accruals 
models (Guay 2006). 
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Model (8) provides for both roles of accruals: mitigation of noise in cash flows and 
asymmetric recognition of unrealized gains and losses.  Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
predict a negative γ2 and positive incremental coefficient γ3 for accounting conservatism.. 
To examine hypothesis, auditor tenure (TENURE) is added in model (8) to interact 
with other independent variables:   
 
ACCit = γ0 + γ1DCFOit + γ2CFOit + γ3CFOit* DCFOit + γ4TENUREit  
                   + γ5DCFOit* TENUREit + γ6CFOit* TENUREit 
+ γ7CFOit* DCFOit* TENUREit + ε                    (9) 
 
If longer auditor tenure impairs auditor independence, leading to less conservative 
financial reporting, then the positive correlation between operating cash flows and 
accruals will be reduced as auditor tenure lengthens: that is, γ7 is predicted to be negative.  
I offer no prediction for the intercept γ0 or the coefficients γ1, γ4, γ5, and γ6. 
I also include BM, LEV, LIGA, and SIZE to control for other sources of 
conservatism.  The switching simultaneous equations model is applied as well to test the 
predicted association between auditor tenure and auditor conservatism.  
The accrual-based test of conservatism also has limitations.  First, this methodology 
relies on an assumption that the cash flow implications from a current news event are 
present in the current year and are persistent: that is, a current bad economic event will 
reduce both current and future bad cash flow projections (Bushman and Piotroski 2006, 
Ball and Shivakumar 2006).  Second, some of the new information about cash flows 
relates to “unbooked” items such as growth options and synergies, which affect neither 
“bookable” gains or losses nor current-period cash flows, or some affect one but not the 
other (Ball and Shivakumar 2006).  Third, this methodology assumes that cash flow from 
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operations is an unbiased measure of economic circumstances.  However, Roychowdhury 
(2006) finds evidence consistent with management manipulating real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses.  Despite the different limitations mentioned for each of the 
measures used in this study, I believe that consistency of results will mitigate concerns 
about the potential errors and biases associated with a particular research design.  
 
5.5 Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of all firm-years from 1988 to 2004 inclusive with 
sufficient required data from both Compustat and CRSP.  All firms with SIC codes from 
6000-6999 (financial services) are excluded because accounting rules are different for 
these industries and they are more heavily regulated.  I exclude those public firms audited 
by small audit firms because prior research has suggested that big audit firms have a 
higher reputation in auditing and companies might have different incentives to select 
audit firms (Craswell et al. 1995, Francis et al. 1999, Reynolds and Francis 2001).  The 
observations in the top or bottom 0.5 percent of the distribution of market-adjusted 
returns, operating income, and cash flow from operations are deleted to mitigate the 
effects of outliers.   
   I measure auditor tenure (TENURE) as the cumulative number of years since the 
auditor has been employed.  Because the choice of the auditing firm is unavailable before 
the firm enters Compustat (e.g., pre-IPO), tenure is set to one year the first time financial 
information becomes available.  TENURE was truncated as of 1974 because information 
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regarding a firm’s auditor/opinion begins in Compustat in 1974.26  Any measure of tenure 
that relies on Compustat is potentially biased downward (Mansi et al. 2004).  However, 
the use of the categorical variable TENURE will mitigate this bias by defining TENURE 
less than or equal to three years as a short-term relationship, longer than or equal to nine 
years as a long-term relationship, and medium-term relationshis between them (Johnson 
et al. 2002).  In additional tests, I measure auditor tenure as a categorical variable to 
accurately classify observations.  
Consistent with Myers et al. (2003) and Stanley and DeZoort (2007), auditor changes 
attributable to audit firm mergers were coded as a continuation of the prior auditor.  I 
limit my analyses to years beginning in 1988 to provide some variation for auditor tenure; 
in addition, 1988 is the first year the COMPUSTAT database provides operating cash 
flows for public firms.  
 
                                                 
 
 





6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 describes the composition of auditor tenure groups in my sample and 
changes in the composition over 1988-2004, where short auditor tenure is defined as 
auditor-client relationships less than or equal to 3 years, medium auditor tenure is defined 
as auditor-client relationships greater than 3 years but less than 9 years, and long auditor 
tenure is defined as auditor-client relationships longer than or equal to 9 years.  Table 1 
Panel A shows that among 35,124 firm-year observations, around 19 percent of the 
observations have a short auditor-client relationship.  Around 37 and 44 percent of the 
observations are in the medium tenure group and the long tenure group, respectively.   
Table 1 Panel B shows that the percentages of observations in each auditor tenure 
group vary over time, but in most years, more observations are in the long tenure group.  
Figure 2a and 2b graphically show the trend of auditor-client relationships over time.  In 
particular, Figure 2a shows that the mean values of auditor tenure (around 9 years) are 
quite stable over 1988-2004 with the shortest auditor tenure at 2002.  Figure 2b shows 
that the proportions of each tenure group are stable before 1994.  However, since 1995 
the proportions of the medium (long) tenure group have increased (decreased), with the 
peak (dip) in 2001 (2002).  The dramatic increases (decreases) of observations in the 
short (medium) tenure group after 2002 are mostly likely driven by the collapse of Arthur 





Panel A: Composition of Auditor Tenure Groups  
 
Group Tenure (years) Observations Percentage 
Short < = 3 6783 19.31% 
Medium > = 4, and < = 8 12931 36.82% 
Long > = 9 15410 43.87% 
Total  35124 100% 
 
 
Panel B: Composition of Auditor Tenure Groups over Time 
 
Year Observations Short Medium Long 
1988 1268 17.74% 34.84% 47.43% 
1989 1390 15.18% 39.14% 45.68% 
1990 1429 15.33% 32.61% 52.06% 
1991 1480 15.88% 33.51% 50.61% 
1992 1495 16.99% 34.72% 48.29% 
1993 1673 14.82% 36.52% 48.66% 
1994 1660 16.33% 34.52% 49.16% 
1995 1899 17.17% 38.49% 44.34% 
1996 2246 16.70% 40.65% 42.65% 
1997 1497 11.16% 41.82% 47.03% 
1998 2542 17.31% 42.01% 40.68% 
1999 2588 17.55% 40.47% 41.98% 
2000 2408 17.51% 36.93% 45.56% 
2001 2843 14.52% 44.06% 41.42% 
2002 2988 30.59% 33.67% 35.74% 
2003 2872 29.67% 30.68% 39.66% 


























































Figure 2a: The Means of Auditor Tenure over Time 
a 
. Figure 2b: The Means of 





Auditor tenure is the number of years since the auditors have been employed. 
b 
Short tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to three years; 
Medium tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to eight years 
but greater than or equal to four years; and long tenure groups are firms with auditor-client 
relationships longer than or equal to nine years. 
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Table 2 reports the summary statistics for my sample.  I report the mean, standard 
deviation, first quartile, median, third quartile, minimum, and maximum for TENURE, 
TA, RETURN, NI, ∆NI, CFO, MV, LEV and BM.  The mean/median tenure is 10/7 
years.  All other variables except LEV are right skewed.  For example, the mean/median 
of total assets (TA) is $1,744/235 million, and the mean/median of operating cash flows 
(CFO) is $164/16 million.  Most firms have book-to-market ratios (BM) less than 1, 
which suggests that the portion of market values reflecting growth options are not 
captured in book values.   
Table 3 reports the pairwise Pearson product-moment correlations.  Most correlations 
are significant at a 10 percent level or better.  For example, auditor tenure (TENURE) is 
significantly positively associated with the firm’s total assets (TA), net income (NI) and 
cash flows from operations (CFO), which suggests that auditor-client relationships 
lengthen as firms grow.  
 
6.2 Multivariate Regression Results 
6.2.1 Timeliness of earnings to reflect ‘news’  
Table 4 reports the results for the first set of tests based on the timeliness of earnings 
to news.  In panel A, I report the estimates of model (1), that is, the regression of earnings 
on market-adjusted stock returns without including incremental intercept and slope 
coefficients for TENURE.  The results show evidence consistent with conservatism.  In 
particular, the coefficient α3, which captures the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad 
news relative to good news (i.e., the degree of conservatism), is significantly positive (α3  
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Mean SD 25% 50% 75% Min Max 
TENURE 10  7  4  7  14  1  31  
TA 1743.753  4988.698  60.990  234.767  1053.700  0.113  244192.530  
RETURN 0.070  0.580  -0.279  -0.037  0.255  -0.844  4.000  
NI 74.571  258.921  -0.808  6.631  44.997  -1017.134  3533.000  
∆NI 11.868  195.027  -3.577  0.734  10.309  -3735.707  16329.132  
CFO 164.023  450.192  1.379  16.136  97.730  -110.539  4375.000  
LEV 0.485  0.280  0.299  0.487  0.641  0.001  24.823  
BM 0.600  2.912  0.286 0.504  0.820  -333.230  22.090 
 
∆NI is the change of net income in current year. See Appendix B for other variable definitions. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlations  
 
 TENURE TA RETURN NI ∆NI CFO LEV BM 
TENURE 1.000  0.157  -0.017  0.190  0.019  0.189  0.075  -0.018  
TA  1.000  -0.006  0.656  0.115  0.832  0.178  -0.012  
RETURN   1.000  0.023  0.054  0.009  -0.017  -0.027  
NI    1.000  0.293  0.836  0.088  -0.017  
∆NI     1.000  0.174  0.020  -0.030  
CFO      1.000  0.151  -0.020  
LEV       1.000  -0.106  
BM        1.000  
 
 
The numbers in bold are significant at 10 percent or better. ∆NI is the change of net income in current 
year. See Appendix B for other variable definitions. 
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Table 4 
Pooled Cross-sectional Regressions of Earnings on Market-adjusted Stock Fiscal-
year Returns  
 




Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT α0 ? 0.033  12.807  0.00  
DR α1 ? 0.032  7.791  0.00  
R α2 + -0.029  -8.624  0.00  
DR*R α3 + 0.385  39.919  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   5.59%   
No. of obs   35124   
 




Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT α0 ? 0.006  1.316  0.19  
DR α1 ? 0.042  5.962  0.00  
R α2 + -0.030  -5.344  0.00  
DR*R α3 + 0.478  29.848  0.00  
TENURE α4 ? 0.003  7.249  0.00  
DR*TENURE α5 ? -0.002  -2.784  0.01  
R*TENURE α6 + 0.001  1.164  0.24  
R*DR*TENURE α7 - -0.015  -9.582  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)  6.92%   
















(Table 4 continued) 
Panel C: Timeliness of earnings to news by auditor tenure group a 
 
  Short Tenure Medium Tenure Long Tenure 
 Coeff Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT α0 0.018  2.111  0.03  0.009  2.008  0.04  0.054  22.306  0.00  
DR α1 0.029  2.101  0.04  0.039  5.253  0.00  0.019  4.899  0.00  
R α2 -0.016  -1.545  0.12  -0.030  -5.510  0.00  -0.025  -6.783  0.00  
DR*R α3 0.413  13.489  0.00  0.399  25.030  0.00  0.287  28.128  0.00  
           
Adj-R2 (%) 3.99%   5.96%   6.20%    




Short tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to three years; Medium tenure group contains firms with auditor-
client relationships less than or equal to eight years but greater than or equal to four years; and long tenure group contains firms with auditor-client 
relationships longer than or equal to nine years. 
 
All the p-values are two sided. See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
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= 0.385, p = 0.00), consistent with earnings being more responsive to contemporaneous 
bad news than good news in all sample firms.   
To examine the predicted variation of conservatism with auditor tenure, I estimate 
model (1) separately for each year of auditor tenure ranging from 1 to 31 years.  Figure 
3a graphs the estimates.  The degree of conservatism as measured by asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings to news (i.e., α3) dramatically decreases as auditor tenure increases.  
Model (2) is used to formally test this conclusion.  In Panel B of Table 4, I report 
estimates of model (2), including intercept and slope coefficients for TENURE.  The 
coefficient on α3 continues to be significantly positive.  However, the coefficient α7 is 
significantly negative (α7 = – 0.015, p = 0.00), which suggests that the earnings of firms 
with longer auditor tenure reflect bad news less quickly than firms with short auditor 
tenure.  This is consistent with the hypothesis H1a that longer auditor tenure reduces 












































Conservatism is measured by the degree of timeliness of earnings to news (i.e., α3) based on model 
(1). Auditor tenure is the number of years since the auditors have been employed.  
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To mitigate the possibility that the observed association between auditor tenure and 
conservatism measured by timeliness of earnings to news is nonlinear, Table 4 Panel C 
reports the regression results of model (1) separately for each tenure group (short auditor 
tenure group, medium auditor tenure group, and long auditor tenure group).  It is apparent 
that conservatism which is evident in the overall sample (Table 4 Panel A) is also present 
within each of the tenure groups.  In all cases, the coefficients α3 are significantly positive.  
However, the magnitude of α3 is decreasing as tenure increases (e.g., 0.413, 0.399, 0.287 
for the short tenure group, medium tenure group, and long tenure group, respectively), 
which provides further evidence that conservatism, as measured by the timeliness of 
earnings to reflect bad news, is decreasing when auditor tenure lengthens.27   
6.2.2 Persistence of negative earnings changes 
Table 5 reports the results of the second test of the association between auditor 
tenure and conservatism, where conservatism is measured by the persistence of negative 
earnings changes.  These tests focus on the overall extent to which earnings changes 
reverse asymmetrically, and whether the extent of asymmetric reversal differs in the 
length of auditor tenure.  In Panel A of Table 5, I report the estimates of model (3), that is, 
without including the incremental effect of auditor tenure.  The results show that the 
coefficient β3 is significantly negative (β3 = – 0.938, p = 0.00), which suggests that  
                                                 
 
 
27 To ensure that the market response to the previous year’s earnings is excluded, I also calculate market-
adjusted returns to end three months after the fiscal year-end (Basu 1997). In addition, Gigler and Hemmer 
(2001) recommend using a return window that excludes the market reaction to both the prior year’s 
earnings release as well as the current year’s earnings release. To incorporate this approach, I also calculate 
a nine-month period return ending at fiscal year-end. The results based on these new measures are 
qualitatively similar to those reported above.     
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Table 5  
Pooled Cross-sectional Regressions of Earnings Changes on Prior-period Earnings 
Changes  
 




Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT β0  ? -0.012  -7.609  0.00  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.039  -15.186  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.116  33.467  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -0.938  -156.879  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   46.19%   
No. of obs   35124   
   
 




Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT β0  ? -0.020  -7.552  0.00  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.055  -12.955  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.222  32.811  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.067  -92.582  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.001  5.782  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? 0.001  3.808  0.00  
∆NIt-1*TENURE β6 - -0.022  -18.141  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 *TENURE β7 + 0.026  12.536  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   46.82%   














(Table 5 continued) 
Panel C: Persistence of earnings changes by auditor tenure group a 
 
  Short Tenure Medium Tenure Long Tenure 
 Coeff Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT β0  -0.022  -3.652  0.00  -0.012  -4.582  0.00  -0.004  -2.625  0.01  
D∆NIt-1 β1 -0.031  -3.297  0.00  -0.067  -16.568  0.00  -0.003  -1.222  0.22  
∆NIt-1 β2 0.227  23.634  0.00  0.072  16.155  0.00  -0.006  -0.953  0.34  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 -0.992  -62.807  0.00  -0.985  -126.706  0.00  -0.420  -32.865  0.00  
           
Adj-R2 (%)  39.83%   62.96%   9.32%   




Short tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to three years; Medium tenure group contains firms with auditor-
client relationships less than or equal to eight years but greater than or equal to four years; and long tenure group contains firms with auditor-client 
relationships longer than or equal to nine years. 
 





earnings changes are reversed more quickly when the earnings changes are negative than 
positive, which is consistent with the interpretation of conservatism.   
Similar to Figure 3a, Figure 3b graphs the changes of conservatism based on model 
(3) for each auditor tenure year ranging from 1 to 31 years.  Generally, the graph in 
Figure 3b shows a decreasing degree of conservatism as auditor tenure lengthens, 
although some noise is found during the last few years of audits.  As a formal test, I 
examine the incremental effect of auditor tenure by testing regression model (4) and the 
results are reported in Panel B of Table 5.  It shows that the regression model has good 
explanatory power (e.g., R2 = 46.82%).  Consistent with hypothesis H1b, the coefficient 
β7 is significantly positive (β7 = 0.026, p = 0.00), which suggests that the rate at which 
the negative earnings changes are reversed (i.e., conservatism) is reduced when auditor 











































Conservatism is measured by the reversal rate of negative earnings changes (i.e., β3) based on model 
(3). The estimates in graph are multiplied by – 1 for purpose of illustration. Auditor tenure is the 
number of years since the auditors have been employed. 
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Table 5 Panel C reports the separate estimates of model (3) for firms with short 
auditor tenure, medium auditor tenure, and long auditor tenure, respectively.  The 
conservatism, as measured by the quick reversal of negative earnings changes, is evident 
in each group (e.g., β3 is significantly negative).  Moreover, as auditor tenure increases, 
the coefficient β3 becomes less negative (e.g., – 0.992, – 0.985, – 0.420 for the short 
tenure group, medium tenure group, and long tenure group, respectively, suggesting 
decreasing conservatism with auditor tenure.  Thus, the results further strengthen the 
negative association between auditor tenure and conservatism reported in Panel B of 
Table 5.  
6.2.3 Control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 and Table 5 are consistent with the hypothesis 
H1a and H1b, respectively.  They suggest that as auditor tenure lengthens, firms 
recognize unexpected losses in earnings in a less timely fashion, that is, firms report less 
conservatively.  To mitigate the concern that the estimated standard errors in the pooled 
regressions likely are affected by cross-sectional correlation, I estimate Fama-Macbeth t-
statistics derived from annual cross-sectional regressions of models (2) and (4).  The 
estimated coefficient is the average of the annual slope coefficients.  The t-statistic is the 
ratio of the sample mean to the standard deviation of the time-series distribution of the 
estimated coefficients, divided by the square root of the number of annual cross-sections.  
The new results are similar to those reported in Panel B of Table 4 and Panel B of Table 
5.  A second concern relates to the potential impact of time-series dependence in my data.  
I use Durbin-Watson tests for model (2) and model (4) directed at testing the association 
between auditor tenure and conservatism.  Although Durbin-Watson statistics indicate 
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that time-series dependence is minimal in my setting, I have also re-estimated models (2) 
and (4) by using the Newey-West procedures and find that the primary results are not 
qualitatively changed.28 
 
6.3 Control for Other Sources of Conservatism 
Table 6 presents the results of models (5) and (6) directed at testing the effect of 
long-term auditor-client relationships and conservatism after controlling for other sources 
of conservatism.  The results in Panel A show that the incremental effect of auditor tenure 
on timeliness of earnings to reflect news is still significant.  Specifically, the coefficient 
on the interaction term R*DR*TENURE (i.e., α7) is – 0.014 and the p-value is 0.00, 
which suggests that the previously found negative association between auditor tenure and 
timeliness of earnings to news is not driven by other sources of conservatism.   
All of the controlled effects of BM, LEV, LIGA, and SIZE on conservatism are 
significant and have directions consistent with LaFond and Watts (2006).  In particular, I 
find that a large book-to-market ratio (BM) is associated with less conditional 
conservatism (α11= – 0.007, p = 0.00).  The significant positive coefficient on the 
interaction term R*DR*LEV (α15 = 0.380, p = 0.05) is consistent with the findings of 
Frankel and Roychowdhury (2006) that firms with higher leverage report more 
conservative earnings.  Auditors report more conservatively for clients with higher 
litigation risk against auditors, which is suggested by the significant coefficient of  
                                                 
 
 
28 Specifically, the Durbin-Watson statistic for model (2) is 1.58, which is the region of neither acceptance 
nor rejection of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Durbin-Watson statistic for model (4) is 
1.93, which cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 6 
Control for Other Sources of Conservatism  
 




Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT  α0 ? -0.038  -4.409  0.00  
DR  α1 ? 0.018  1.272  0.00  
R  α2 + -0.061  -4.958  0.20  
DR*R  α3 + 0.478  15.590  0.00  
TENURE  α4 ? 0.002  4.382  0.00  
DR*TENURE  α5 ? -0.002  -2.978  0.00  
R*TENURE  α6 + 0.001  1.159  0.00  
R*DR*TENURE  α7 - -0.013  -9.024  0.25  
BM  α8 ? -0.007  -4.666  0.00  
DR*BM  α9 ? 0.019  6.071  0.00  
R*BM  α10 + 0.024  5.297  0.00  
R*DR*BM  α11 -/+ -0.007  -1.223  0.00  
LEV  α12 ? -0.084  -8.170  0.22  
DR*LEV  α13 ? 0.096  5.900  0.00  
R*LEV  α14 - 0.018  1.531  0.00  
R*DR*LEV  α15 + 0.380  14.347  0.05  
LIGA  α16 ? -0.498  -5.635  0.00  
DR*LIGA  α17 ? 0.223  1.689  0.00  
R*LIGA  α18 ? 0.213  2.291  0.09  
R*DR*LIGA  α19 + 0.137  0.541  0.02  
SIZE  α20 ? 0.017  13.944  0.59  
DR*SIZE  α21 ? -0.007  -3.628  0.00  
R*SIZE  α22 + 0.003  1.852  0.00  
R*DR*SIZE  α23 - -0.054  -11.569  0.06  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   12.46%   









(Table 6 continued) 




Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT β0 ? -0.039  -6.975  0.00  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.094  -10.541  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.205  14.800  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.039  -43.905  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.001  3.239  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? 0.001  3.556  0.00  
∆NIt-1*TENURE β6 - -0.018  -14.514  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 *TENURE β7 + 0.023  11.031  0.00  
BM β8 ? 0.001  1.357  0.17  
D∆NI t-1*BM β9 ? -0.002  -1.218  0.22  
∆NI t-1*BM β10 - -0.004  -2.151  0.03  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*BM β11 -/+ 0.002  0.363  0.72  
LEV β12 ? -0.049  -6.992  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*LEV β13 ? 0.092  8.740  0.00  
∆NI t-1*LEV β14 + 0.127  8.560  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1 *LEV β15 - -0.196  -10.080  0.00  
LIGA β16 ? 0.027  0.353  0.72  
D∆NI t-1*LIGA β17 ? -0.280  -2.978  0.00  
∆NI t-1*LIGA β18 ? -1.016  -5.528  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*LIGA β19 - -0.838  -2.978  0.00  
SIZE β20 ? 0.008  10.106  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*SIZE β21 ? -0.001  -0.791  0.43  
∆NI t-1*SIZE β22 - -0.014  -5.546  0.00  
D∆NI t-1∆NI t-1 *SIZE β23 + -0.047  -10.905  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   50.21%   
No. of obs   33566   
 
 









R*DR*LIGA (α19 = 0.137, p = 0.02).  Lastly, I find a significant negative relation 
between firm size and conservatism (α23 = – 0.054, p = 0.06), which is consistent with the 
argument of Basu (2001) and LaFond and Watts (2006).  In particular, larger firms have 
more income aggregation and the relative amount of public information which reduces 
information asymmetry, resulting in a lower level of conservatism. 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) suggest that estimating the asymmetric timeliness 
cumulatively over multiple periods preceding a given year generates a better measure of 
conservatism than that estimated over that year.29  Following Basu (1997, Table 5), 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) and LaFond and Watts (2006), I reestiamte model (5) 
by regressing cumulative earnings on cumulative returns.  Earnings and returns are 
cumulated over the current and the prior two fiscal years.  The results from the above 
tests are consistent with the results reported in Table 5. 
Table 6 Panel B presents the results of the association between auditor tenure and 
conservatism after controlling for BM, LEV, LIGA, and SIZE, where conservatism is 
measured by the extent of the persistence of negative earnings changes.  I continually 
find that long-term auditor-client relationships negatively affect conservatism as 
evidenced by a significant positive coefficient on the interactive term D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-
1*TENURE (β7 = 0.023, p = 0.00).  With respect to the controlled factors, Panel B shows 
that firms with higher leverage ratio (LEV) and higher litigation risk (LIGA) report 
                                                 
 
 
29 Annual horizon estimates of the Basu coefficient are affected by firms’ failure to record asset write-
downs because previous asset value increases were not recorded due to conservatism (the “buffer” 
problem). Pae et al. (2005) suggest that this effect causes the annual Basu coefficient to underestimate the 
degree of conservatism. Roychowdhury and Watts (2006) provide evidence that the buffer problem is 
significantly reduced by estimating the Basu coefficient using three year estimation interval. 
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conservatively (β15 = – 0.196, p = 0.00; β19= – 0.838, p = 0.00), which is consistent with 
the findings reported in Panel A of Table 6.  Although Panel B does not show a 
significant effect of BM ratio on conservatism, it shows that a larger firm (SIZE) has a 
quick reversal rate of negative earnings changes, which means more conservatism.  
Although the interpretations with respect to SIZE are opposite to those reported in Table 
6 Panel A, LaFond and Watts (2006) argue that large firms could report more 
conservatively due to high political costs. 
In summary, the results reported in Table 6 Panel A and Panel B lend support to the 
primary hypothesis H1 that longer auditor-client relationships will impair auditor 
independence and hence, reduce conservatism.  The combined results indicate that the 
influence of long-term auditor tenure on conservatism can not be attributed to other 
potential sources of conservatism, specifically, growth options, debt contracts, litigation 
risk, or firm size. 
 
6.4 Control for Endogeneity 
Table 7 and Table 8 report the regression results after controlling for endogeneity, 
with the measures of conservatism using timeliness of earnings to news and persistence 
of earnings changes, respectively.  In each table, Panel A and Panel B report the results 
without and with controls for other sources of conservatism, respectively.  Appendix C 
presents the results from the first stage model that predicts auditor tenure.  To more fully 
examine whether accounting conservatism varies at different auditor tenure stages, I 
designate auditor tenure (TENURE) as a dummy variable so that I can compare  
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Table 7 
Control for Endogeneity  
 
Panel A: Timeliness of earnings to news 
a 
 




Sign Estimate t-stat 
p- 
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT α0 ? 0.028  1.559  0.12  0.158  11.007  0.00  0.162  17.896  0.00  
DR α1 ? 0.042  1.754  0.08  0.070  3.501  0.00  0.036  2.798  0.01  
R α2 + -0.001  -0.050  0.96  -0.044  -2.794  0.01  0.005  0.547  0.58  
DR*R α3 + 0.458  8.615  0.00  0.583  12.767  0.00  0.380  13.069  0.00  
TENURE α4 ? -0.009  -1.060  0.29  -0.012  -2.426  0.02  -0.004  -1.398  0.16  
DR*TENURE α5 ? -0.001  -0.101  0.92  -0.019  -2.474  0.01  -0.007  -1.434  0.15  
R*TENURE α6 + -0.014  -1.325  0.19  0.013  2.042  0.04  -0.002  -0.409  0.68  
R*DR*TENURE α7 - -0.031  -1.025  0.31  -0.127  -7.016  0.00  -0.062  -5.279  0.00  
LAMBDA  ? 0.003  0.192  0.85  -0.130  -34.268  0.00  -0.235  -35.537  0.00  
            
Adj-R2 (%)   5.49%   12.12%   11.67%   
No. of obs   18864   27371   21363   
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(Table 7 continued) 
Panel B: Timeliness of earnings to news with controls (continued on the next page) 
 
   Short vs. Medium Medium vs. Long Short vs. Long 








INTERCEPT  α0 ? -0.091  -4.205  0.00  0.131  8.276  0.00  0.141  10.570  0.00  
DR  α1 ? 0.028  0.825  0.41  0.067  3.090  0.00  -0.005  -0.288  0.77  
R  α2 + -0.011  -0.468  0.64  -0.096  -5.339  0.00  -0.034  -2.032  0.04  
DR*R  α3 + 0.476  6.501  0.00  0.760  15.430  0.00  0.343  8.004  0.00  
TENURE  α4 ? -0.002  -0.219  0.83  -0.009  -1.697  0.09  -0.002  -0.510  0.61  
DR*TENURE  α5 ? 0.001  0.104  0.92  -0.016  -2.050  0.04  -0.004  -0.893  0.37  
R*TENURE  α6 + -0.020  -2.003  0.05  0.011  1.654  0.10  -0.004  -0.956  0.34  
R*DR*TENURE  α7 - 0.019  0.629  0.53  -0.105  -5.785  0.00  -0.039  -3.337  0.00  
BM  α8 ? 0.000  -0.019  0.98  -0.007  -4.961  0.00  -0.006  -2.459  0.01  
DR*BM  α9 ? 0.011  1.404  0.16  0.013  4.623  0.00  0.008  2.164  0.03  
R*BM  α10 + 0.024  3.811  0.00  0.022  5.117  0.00  0.017  2.254  0.02  
R*DR*BM  α11 -/+ -0.073  -4.682  0.00  -0.014  -2.464  0.01  -0.011  -1.312  0.19  
LEV  α12 ? -0.081  -4.904  0.00  -0.103  -10.261  0.00  -0.099  -8.095  0.00  
DR*LEV  α13 ? 0.097  3.780  0.00  0.030  1.929  0.05  0.148  7.675  0.00  
R*LEV  α14 - 0.016  0.885  0.38  0.022  1.834  0.07  0.036  2.410  0.02  
R*DR*LEV  α15 + 0.380  7.434  0.00  0.065  1.954  0.05  0.542  13.299  0.00  
LIGA  α16 ? -0.476  -4.433  0.00  -0.413  -3.757  0.00  -0.196  -1.509  0.13  
DR*LIGA  α17 ? 0.073  0.376  0.71  0.071  0.462  0.64  0.289  1.688  0.09  
R*LIGA  α18 ? 0.178  1.512  0.13  0.062  0.392  0.70  0.167  1.595  0.11  
R*DR*LIGA  α19 + 0.083  0.216  0.83  -0.544  -1.867  0.06  0.622  1.923  0.05  
SIZE  α20 ? 0.022  10.881  0.00  0.009  7.900  0.00  0.007  5.373  0.00  
DR*SIZE  α21 ? -0.010  -3.025  0.00  -0.006  -3.197  0.00  -0.009  -4.243  0.00  
R*SIZE  α22 + 0.002  0.727  0.47  0.007  4.144  0.00  0.003  1.528  0.13  
R*DR*SIZE  α23 - -0.068  -8.961  0.00  -0.058  -12.878  0.00  -0.062  -11.531  0.00  
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LAMBDA  ? 0.038  2.448  0.01  -0.110  -27.648  0.00  -0.191  -26.738  0.00  
            
Adj-R2 (%)   11.54%   15.75%   15.63%   




Short tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to three years; Medium tenure group contains firms with auditor-
client relationships less than or equal to eight years but greater than or equal to four years; and long tenure group contains firms with auditor-client 
relationships longer than or equal to nine years. Long or medium tenure groups are coded as one when compared with the short tenure group (coded as 
zero); Long tenure group is coded as one when compared with the medium tenure group (coded as zero).  
 







 Control for Endogeneity (Continued) 
 




   Short vs. Medium Medium vs. Long Short vs. Long 








INTERCEPT β0  ? -0.063  -4.621  0.00  0.028  3.035  0.00  0.013  1.771  0.08  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? 0.010  0.646  0.52  -0.189  -16.237  0.00  -0.036  -3.980  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.388  24.800  0.00  0.223  11.099  0.00  0.349  33.413  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.009  -38.909  0.00  -2.098  -52.280  0.00  -1.284  -69.201  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.013  2.191  0.03  -0.005  -1.629  0.10  0.003  1.381  0.17  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? -0.038  -4.249  0.00  0.062  13.810  0.00  0.012  3.308  0.00  






0.011  0.727  0.47  0.554  29.365  0.00  0.279  22.357  0.00  
LAMBDA β8 ? 0.047  3.340  0.00  -0.031  -9.732  0.00  -0.063  -9.252  0.00  
            
Adj-R2 (%)   52.71%   55.67%   36.26%   











(Table 8 continued) 
Panel B: Persistence of earnings changes with controls 
 
  Short vs. Medium          Medium vs. Long           Short vs. Long 








INTERCEPT β0 ? -0.081  -5.267  0.00  0.000  -0.020  0.98  -0.006  -0.606  0.54  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.071  -3.327  0.00  -0.161  -12.673  0.00  -0.128  -10.341  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.428  16.617  0.00  0.240  11.497  0.00  -0.041  -1.706  0.09  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.049  -25.544  0.00  -1.705  -37.638  0.00  -1.471  -38.851  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.010  1.714  0.09  -0.005  -1.560  0.12  0.004  2.075  0.04  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? -0.042  -4.868  0.00  0.057  12.389  0.00  0.014  4.276  0.00  





+ -0.094  -5.851  0.00  0.490  25.757  0.00  0.294  25.218  0.00  
BM β8 ? -0.001  -0.431  0.67  0.001  1.239  0.22  0.000  0.448  0.65  
D∆NI t-1*BM β9 ? 0.017  3.763  0.00  -0.004  -2.833  0.00  0.005  2.653  0.01  
∆NI t-1*BM β10 - 0.001  0.222  0.82  -0.004  -2.527  0.01  -0.001  -0.634  0.53  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*BM β11 -/+ 0.032  2.436  0.01  -0.006  -1.488  0.14  0.029  5.293  0.00  
LEV β12 ? -0.067  -5.886  0.00  -0.027  -4.368  0.00  -0.057  -6.871  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*LEV β13 ? 0.136  8.305  0.00  -0.007  -0.774  0.44  0.150  11.797  0.00  
∆NI t-1*LEV β14 + 0.142  6.937  0.00  -0.069  -4.938  0.00  0.335  13.219  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1 *LEV β15 - -0.295  -10.637  0.00  -0.157  -7.774  0.00  -0.590  -19.671  0.00  
LIGA β16 ? 0.037  0.357  0.72  0.201  2.856  0.00  -0.203  -1.996  0.05  
D∆NI t-1*LIGA β17 ? -0.400  -3.088  0.00  -0.032  -0.360  0.72  0.543  3.959  0.00  
∆NI t-1*LIGA β18 ? -1.153  -2.625  0.01  -0.841  -5.515  0.00  -0.783  -4.211  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*LIGA β19 - -1.338  -2.584  0.01  -2.003  -8.250  0.00  -4.085  -6.981  0.00  
SIZE β20 ? 0.011  7.814  0.00  0.006  7.915  0.00  0.004  4.474  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*SIZE β21 ? 0.001  0.493  0.62  -0.001  -0.538  0.59  0.001  0.657  0.51  
∆NI t-1*SIZE β22 - -0.040  -11.259  0.00  -0.001  -0.403  0.69  0.047  12.783  0.00  
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D∆NI t-1∆NI t-1 *SIZE β23 + -0.012  -1.959  0.05  -0.035  -8.874  0.00  -0.043  -6.530  0.00  
LAMBDA β24 ? 0.047  3.207  0.00  -0.021  -6.318  0.00  -0.022  -3.221  0.00  
            
Adj-R2 (%)   55.87%   56.83%   47.99%   
No. of obs   18651   27318   21167   
 
a 
Short tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to three years; Medium tenure group contains firms with auditor-
client relationships less than or equal to eight years but greater than or equal to four years; and long tenure group contains firms with auditor-client 
relationships longer than or equal to nine years. Long or medium tenure groups are coded as one when compared with the short tenure group (coded as 
zero); Long tenure group is coded one when compared with the medium tenure group (coded as zero).  
 





conservatism between the short (medium) (long) tenure group and the medium (long) 
(short) tenure group.   
Specifically, Table 7 shows that in almost all of the regressions, the coefficients on 
the inverse Mills ratio (LAMBDA) are statistically significant, which justifies 
endogeneity concerns.  Panel A shows that the coefficient on the interactive term 
R*DR*TENURE, α7, is significantly negative when I compare the medium (α7 = – 0.127, 
p = 0.00) or short tenure group (α7 = – 0.062, p = 0.00) with the long tenure group.  
However, when the short tenure group is compared with the medium tenure group, the 
coefficient α7 is negative but insignificant (α7 = – 0.031, p = 0.31), which suggests no 
significant difference regarding conservatism between these two auditor tenure groups.  
Controlling for other factors related to conservatism has little impact on the coefficient α7; 
that is, when auditor tenure lengthens (e.g., longer than or equal to 9 years), the earnings 
of firms reflecting bad news become less timely.   
In addition, in the second test of conservatism, Table 8 also shows the presence of an 
endogeneity problem (e.g., the significant coefficients on LAMBDA).  The results in 
Table 8 Panel A and Panel B suggest that after controlling for endogeneity and other 
sources of conservatism, the extent of conservatism as measured by the reversal rate of 
negative earnings changes (e.g., β7) is lowest for firms that have the longest auditor-client 
relationships (i.e., long auditor tenure group).  One intriguing finding in Table 8 Panel B 
is that firms during the middle years of audits appear to report higher conservatism than 
firms during initial years of audits (e.g., β7 = – 0.094, p = 0.00, in short auditor tenure 
group vs. medium auditor tenure group), which provides some evidence consistent with a 
learning curve effect. 
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Taken together, the results in Table 7 and Table 8, where I control for potential 
simultaneity bias arising from auditor tenure choice, suggest that the firms with longer 
auditor-client relationships (i.e., longer than or equal to nine years) record unexpected 
losses less quickly than firms with short or medium auditor-client relationships (i.e., 
reduced conservatism).  However, I find no evidence showing the decreasing 
conservatism when auditor-client relationships change from short periods to medium 
periods. 
 
6.5 Alternative Measure of Conservatism 
To avoid the potential limitations contained in the two tests of conservatism based on 
Basu (1997), I examine the effect of auditor tenure on conservatism using the accrual-
based measure of conservatism designed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005).  Table 9 reports 
this set of results.  In Panel A, I report the regression results of model (8) using the 
pooled estimates without including the incremental effect of auditor tenure.  The 
coefficient γ2 is – 0.533 and significantly negative, implying that on average 53.3% of 
cash flow is offset by accruals in the years it is positive.  γ3 is 0.783 and significant, 
implying that in years with negative cash flows, only 25% (78.3 – 53.5%) of cash flow is 
offset by accruals.  Thus, the negative relation between accruals and cash flow is less 
pronounced when cash flow is negative, consistent with asymmetric recognition of 
unrealized losses than gains (i.e., more conservatism). 
Panel B shows the results with the incremental effect of auditor tenure.  The 
significantly negative coefficient on the interactive term CFO*DCFO*TENURE (γ7= – 
0.044, p = 0.00) indicates that in negative cash flows years, the firms with long-term  
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Table 9  
Alternative Measure of Conservatism  
 





Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT γ0 ? -0.007  -4.192  0.00  
DCFO γ1 ? -0.006  -2.105  0.04  
CFO γ2 - -0.533  -41.532  0.00  
CFO*DCFO γ3 + 0.783  54.457  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   8.39%   
No. of obs   35124   
 
 





Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT γ0 ? -0.009  -3.095  0.00  
DCFO γ1 ? -0.002  -0.442  0.66  
CFO γ2 - -0.601  -28.134  0.00  
CFO*DCFO γ3 + 1.061  43.576  0.00  
TENURE γ4 ? 0.000  0.300  0.76  
DCFO*TENURE γ5 ? -0.001  -1.708  0.09  
CFO*TENURE γ6 ? 0.007  3.971  0.00  
CFO*DCFO*TENURE γ7 - -0.044  -17.653  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   10.03%   

















(Table 9 continued) 





Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT γ0 ? 0.003  0.557  0.58  
DCFO γ1 ? 0.026  2.543  0.01  
CFO γ2 - -0.785  -18.395  0.00  
CFO*DCFO γ3 + 1.338  27.333  0.00  
TENURE γ4 ? 0.000  1.419  0.16  
DCFO*TENURE γ5 ? -0.001  -2.503  0.01  
CFO*TENURE γ6 ? 0.001  0.393  0.69  
CFO*DCFO*TENURE γ7 - -0.043  -16.183  0.00  
BM γ8 ? 0.000  0.416  0.68  
DCFO*BM γ9 ? 0.005  2.113  0.03  
CFO*BM γ10 + -0.016  -2.373  0.02  
CFO*DCFO*BM γ11 -/+ 0.114  9.648  0.00  
LEV γ12 ? -0.077  -11.367  0.00  
DCFO*LEV γ13 ? 0.010  1.008  0.31  
CFO*LEV γ14 - -0.080  -1.735  0.08  
CFO*DCFO*LEV γ15 + 0.310  6.552  0.00  
LIGA γ16 ? -0.018  -0.275  0.78  
DCFO*LIGA γ17 ? -0.502  -6.065  0.00  
CFO*LIGA γ18 ? 0.346  0.557  0.58  
CFO*DCFO*LIGA γ19 + -1.945  -3.096  0.00  
SIZE γ20 ? 0.005  5.771  0.00  
DCFO*SIZE γ21 ? -0.009  -5.422  0.00  
CFO*SIZE γ22 + 0.043  7.068  0.00  
CFO*DCFO*SIZE γ23 - -0.095  -11.677  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   14.47%   
No. of obs   33741   
 
 













auditor-client relationships appear to accrue less unrealized losses compared to other 
firms.  In other words, long auditor-client relationships reduce auditors’ tendency to 
report conservatively.   
When I control for other potential effects of BM, LEV, LIGA and SIZE on 
conservatism, Panel C shows similar results on the association of auditor tenure and 
conservatism as previously reported in Table 6.  That is, even after controlling for those 
factors that relate to conservatism, firms with long auditor tenure have a significantly 
greater negative relation between accruals and cash flows (i.e., less conservatism).  
Overall, the results from the alternative measure of conservatism, like the other two 
measures based on the timeliness of earnings to bad news and the persistence of earnings 
changes, generate similar interpretations that auditors report less conservatively when 
their relationships with clients get longer. 
 
6.6 Control for Firm Age 
Firm age (FIRMAGE) is positively related to auditor tenure.  Although I have 
included FIRMAGE in tests of controlling for endogeneity to predict auditor tenure, 
FIRMAGE could also be related to conservatism.  To eliminate the concern that the 
association between auditor tenure and accounting conservatism is simply due to firm age, 
I further include FIRMAGE to control for this effect in all regression models testing the 
incremental effect of auditor tenure on conservatism.  Table 10 reports the new 
estimations by incorporating the effect of firm age.  Although the incremental negative 
effect of auditor tenure (i.e., α7) on conservatism becomes marginally significant when I 
use the measure of timeliness of earnings to news (i.e., Panel A, α7 = – 0.002, p = 0.10),  
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Table 10  
Control for Firm Age  
 




Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT  α0 ? -0.034  -3.913  0.00  
DR  α1 ? 0.015  1.093  0.27  
R  α2 + -0.063  -5.166  0.00  
DR*R  α3 + 0.461  15.042  0.00  
TENURE  α4 ? 0.001  2.337  0.02  
DR*TENURE  α5 ? -0.000  -0.706  0.48  
R*TENURE  α6 + -0.000  -0.632  0.53  
R*DR*TENURE  α7 - -0.002  -1.281  0.20  
BM  α8 ? -0.007  -4.271  0.00  
DR*BM  α9 ? 0.016  5.191  0.00  
R*BM  α10 + 0.022  4.729  0.00  
R*DR*BM  α11 -/+ -0.008  -1.301  0.19  
LEV  α12 ? -0.094  -8.913  0.00  
DR*LEV  α13 ? 0.102  6.108  0.00  
R*LEV  α14 - 0.013  1.078  0.28  
R*DR*LEV  α15 + 0.436  12.740  0.00  
LIGA  α16 ? -0.482  -5.472  0.00  
DR*LIGA  α17 ? 0.235  1.745  0.08  
R*LIGA  α18 ? 0.173  1.808  0.07  
R*DR*LIGA  α19 + 0.286  1.098  0.27  
SIZE  α20 ? 0.016  12.430  0.00  
DR*SIZE  α21 ? -0.006  -2.887  0.00  
R*SIZE  α22 + 0.003  1.904  0.06  
R*DR*SIZE  α23 - -0.046  -9.629  0.00  
AGE α24 ? 0.001  2.748  0.01  
DR*AGE α25 ? -0.001  -3.093  0.00  
R*AGE α26 ? 0.001  3.206  0.00  
R*DR*AGE α27 - -0.011  -10.769  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   13.15%   










(Table 10 continued) 




Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT β0 ? -0.081  -5.267  0.00  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.071  -3.327  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.428  16.617  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.049  -25.544  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.010  1.714  0.09  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? -0.042  -4.868  0.00  
∆NIt-1*TENURE β6 - -0.124  -12.505  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 *TENURE β7 + 0.094  5.851  0.00  
BM β8 ? -0.001  -0.431  0.67  
D∆NI t-1*BM β9 ? 0.017  3.763  0.00  
∆NI t-1*BM β10 - 0.001  0.222  0.82  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*BM β11 -/+ 0.032  2.436  0.01  
LEV β12 ? -0.067  -5.886  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*LEV β13 ? 0.136  8.305  0.00  
∆NI t-1*LEV β14 + 0.142  6.937  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1 *LEV β15 - -0.295  -10.637  0.00  
LIGA β16 ? 0.037  0.357  0.72  
D∆NI t-1*LIGA β17 ? -0.400  -3.088  0.00  
∆NI t-1*LIGA β18 ? -1.153  -2.625  0.01  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*LIGA β19 - -1.338  -2.584  0.01  
SIZE β20 ? 0.011  7.814  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*SIZE β21 ? 0.001  0.493  0.62  
∆NI t-1*SIZE β22 - -0.040  -11.259  0.00  
D∆NI t-1∆NI t-1 *SIZE β23 + -0.012  -1.959  0.05  
AGE β24 ? 0.047  3.207  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*AGE β25 ? -0.081  -5.267  0.00  
∆NI t-1*AGE β26 ? -0.071  -3.327  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*AGE β27 - 0.428  16.617  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   51.03%   
No. of obs   33562   
 
 






using the other two measures of conservatism based on the persistence of earnings 
changes (i.e., in Panel B, β7 = 0.094, p = 0.00) and accruals (not reported) still show 
significant effects of auditor tenure on conservatism in predicted directions at the 1 
percent level.  Hence, the results suggest that the previously observed negative 
association between auditor tenure and conservatism is not simply driven by firm age.  
One intriguing finding in Table 10 Panel A and Panel B is that the significant values of 
coefficients on the interactive term of FIRMAGE (i.e., α27 = – 0.011, β27 = 0.428, p = 0.00) 
suggest that firms tend to reduce their accounting conservatism over time, which is 
consistent with my earlier argument that the demand for conservatism might fade after a 
company has survived in the market for a long time.  
 
6.7 Restricted Sample 
Myers et al. (2003) argue that firms switching auditors early in the relationship might 
differ systematically from firms retaining their auditors for many years.  Ghosh and 
Moon (2005) note that firms might frequently switch auditors either because of “opinion 
shopping” (SEC 1988) or because of auditors’ preference for conservative accounting 
choices (DeFond and Subramanyam 1998).  Hence, consistent with prior studies, I 
eliminate all firm-year observations when the auditor-client relationship lasts for less than 
five years (31,580 observations remain).  This increases comparability because the early 
and later years represent the same auditor-client combinations (Myers et al. 2003).  
Alternatively, I require the sample firms to have at least 15 years of observations (9,682 
observations remain) to increase comparability.  The results obtained using these two 
restricted samples are generally consistent with the previously reported findings.  
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Accordingly, I only report the results using the constant sample (i.e., at least 15 years of 
observations) in Table 11.  I also include all of the controlled variables previously 
mentioned in this study.  Table 11 shows that the directions of interested coefficients, α7 
and β7, are continually consistent with the hypotheses.  With few exceptions, all other 
controlled variables are generally consistent with the previous discussions.30  Thus, by 
using the constant sample, the results continually show a negative relation between 
auditor tenure and conservatism.  
 
6.8 Audit Firm Effects 
I examine whether the results reported in previous tables are consistent across big 
audit firms.  Given the merger of accounting firms in 1989 and 1998, I examine each 
audit firm up to and including the year of merger, with a separate estimate for the new 
merged firm after the year of merger.  Unreported results consistently show a negative 
association between auditor tenure and various measures of accounting conservatism.  
The results are robust after controlling for other variables that relate to accounting 
conservatism.  Hence, this test yields no audit-firm specific evidence of longer auditor-
client relationships being associated with reduced conservatism.  
 
6.9 Excluding the Last-year Audits 
Following Myers et al. (2003), I test whether period-specific characteristics 
around the time of the auditor change are driving my results.  I eliminate firm-years  
                                                 
 
 
30 Specifically, compared with the results shown in Table 6 Panel A (Panel B), Table 11 Panel A (Panel B) 
shows an opposite effect of MB (SIZE) on conservatism.  
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Table 11 
Constant Sample  
 




Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT  α0 ? 0.072  6.874  0.00  
DR  α1 ? 0.068  3.961  0.00  
R  α2 + -0.014  -0.929  0.35  
DR*R  α3 + 0.684  15.434  0.00  
TENURE  α4 ? 0.000  1.174  0.24  
DR*TENURE  α5 ? -0.001  -1.367  0.17  
R*TENURE  α6 + -0.001  -1.337  0.18  
R*DR*TENURE  α7 - -0.002  -1.491  0.07  
BM  α8 ? -0.031  -5.244  0.00  
DR*BM  α9 ? -0.025  -2.919  0.00  
R*BM  α10 + 0.024  2.699  0.01  
R*DR*BM  α11 -/+ -0.226  -12.165  0.00  
LEV  α12 ? -0.106  -9.872  0.00  
DR*LEV  α13 ? 0.050  2.779  0.01  
R*LEV  α14 - -0.021  -1.476  0.14  
R*DR*LEV  α15 + 0.112  2.388  0.02  
LIGA  α16 ? -0.426  -2.449  0.01  
DR*LIGA  α17 ? 2.973  1.578  0.11  
R*LIGA  α18 ? -0.345  -1.212  0.23  
R*DR*LIGA  α19 + 14.204  2.430  0.02  
SIZE  α20 ? 0.007  5.494  0.00  
DR*SIZE  α21 ? -0.008  -3.477  0.00  
R*SIZE  α22 + 0.002  1.032  0.30  
R*DR*SIZE  α23 - -0.061  -9.253  0.00  
AGE α24 ? 0.000  0.758  0.45  
DR*AGE α25 ? -0.001  -1.592  0.11  
R*AGE α26 ? 0.000  0.710  0.48  
R*DR*AGE α27 - -0.004  -3.708  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   15.39%   










(Table 11 continued) 










Sign Estimate t-stat p-value 
INTERCEPT β0 ? -0.021  -3.736  0.00  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.045  -4.634  0.00  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.590  14.722  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.806  -26.437  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.000  1.564  0.12  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? -0.001  -2.438  0.01  
∆NIt-1*TENURE β6 - -0.014  -5.737  0.00  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 *TENURE β7 + 0.005  1.540  0.10  
BM β8 ? -0.003  -1.080  0.28  
D∆NI t-1*BM β9 ? 0.008  1.807  0.07  
∆NI t-1*BM β10 - -0.233  -6.686  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*BM β11 -/+ 0.483  10.773  0.00  
LEV β12 ? 0.005  0.740  0.46  
D∆NI t-1*LEV β13 ? 0.011  1.034  0.30  
∆NI t-1*LEV β14 + -0.726  -11.523  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1 *LEV β15 - -1.163  -14.165  0.00  
LIGA β16 ? -0.812  -1.297  0.19  
D∆NI t-1*LIGA β17 ? 1.936  2.014  0.04  
∆NI t-1*LIGA β18 ? 5.760  0.686  0.49  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*LIGA β19 - -0.191  -0.021  0.98  
SIZE β20 ? 0.004  5.286  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*SIZE β21 ? 0.005  3.854  0.00  
∆NI t-1*SIZE β22 - -0.031  -3.701  0.00  
D∆NI t-1∆NI t-1 *SIZE β23 + 0.154  12.298  0.00  
AGE β24 ? 0.000  -2.008  0.04  
D∆NI t-1*AGE β25 ? 0.000  -0.336  0.74  
∆NI t-1*AGE β26 ? 0.007  3.804  0.00  
D∆NI t-1*∆NI t-1*AGE β27 - -0.018  -7.002  0.00  
      
Adj-R2 (%)   20.16%   
No. of obs   9660   
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representing the last year with the predecessor auditor.  Again, my results are robust to 
this change.  
 
6.10 Earnings Skewness 
Lastly, a number of studies have used earnings skewness to examine earnings 
conservatism because conservative accounting leads to negatively skewed earnings (Basu 
1995, Ball et al. 2000, Givoly and Hayn 2000, Basu et al. 2001b, Lang et al. 2003, 
Krishnan 2005a).  Following prior research, I examine changes of earnings skewness 
over time to look into whether earnings are less negatively skewed (i.e., less conservative) 
when auditor tenure increases.  The skewness measure in each analysis is defined as E(x 
– µ)3/σ3.  Figure 4 depicts the change in the skewness of the net income over total assets 
(i.e., ROA) over time, with skewness ranging from – 19.974 to 3.502.  It apparently 
shows that earnings are less negatively skewed (i.e., less conservatism) when auditor 
tenure increases.  Earnings are most negatively skewed during the initial stage of auditor-
client relationship.  Hence, using another popular measure of earnings conservatism (i.e., 
skewness) again reinforces my conclusion that auditor tenure is negatively associated 





                                                 
 
 
31 I find similarly negative association between auditor tenure and conservatism by examining the skewness 






































, where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of 













7.1 Variation in Auditor Liability Exposure over Time 
Basu (1997) finds that conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of earnings) varies in 
response to auditor litigation exposure.  Kothari et al. (1988) designate 1975 as a high 
liability period, 1976-1982 as a low liability period, 1983-1985 as a high liability period, 
and 1986-1987 as a low liability period.  Basu et al. (2001a) classify 1988-1991 as a high 
liability period, and the period since 1992 (to 1999) as a low legal liability period.  Thus, 
the relation between auditor tenure and conservatism might change over different time 
periods.  The sample years in my study include 1988 to 2004.  I classify 2002-2004 as a 
high legal liability period due to a series of high-profile accounting scandals in 2001 and 
the passage of SOX in 2002.  Thus, I have three alternating high and low legal liability 
periods in my sample: 1988-1991 and 2002-2004 as high legal liability periods, and 
1992-2001 as low legal liability periods.  I test whether the association between auditor 
tenure and conservatism is correlated with changes in auditor liability exposure over 
time.32  
Table 12 Panel A reports the results of model (2) including the incremental effect of 
auditor tenure on conservatism.  Although I do not find evidence that the magnitude of  
                                                 
 
 
32 Choi et al. (2004) partition the period of audit litigation liability environment as follows: a period of 
increasing concerns about litigation liability (1985-1989), a period of lobbying for reform (1990-1994), and 
a post-relief period (1995-1999).  They find that financial riskiness of large U.S. audit firm clienteles varied 
with the changing audit litigation liability periods.  As an additional test, I also classify auditor litigation as 
in Choi et al. (2004). 
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Table 12 
Variation of Conservatism over Different Litigation Regimes  
 

















Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT α0 ? 0.026  3.300  0.00  -0.009  -1.350  0.18  0.015  2.255  0.02  
DR α1 ? 0.016  1.287  0.20  0.052  5.092  0.00  0.041  3.492  0.00  
R α2 + -0.044  -3.468  0.00  -0.023  -2.789  0.01  -0.034  -3.911  0.00  
DR*R α3 + 0.374  12.407  0.00  0.425  19.232  0.00  0.667  21.994  0.00  
TENURE α4 ? 0.002  3.350  0.00  0.003  6.116  0.00  0.002  3.129  0.00  
DR*TENURE α5 ? -0.001  -0.678  0.50  -0.002  -2.664  0.01  -0.001  -0.575  0.57  
R*TENURE α6 + 0.002  1.673  0.09  0.001  1.219  0.22  0.000  -0.433  0.66  
R*DR*TENURE α7 - -0.012  -4.113  0.00  -0.015  -7.306  0.00  -0.009  -2.789  0.01  
            
Adj-R2 (%)   9.94%   5.16%   14.39%   












(Table 12 continued) 
















Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT γ0 ? -0.005  -0.830  0.41  -0.008  -1.866  0.06  -0.013  -3.070  0.00  
DCFO γ1 ? -0.014  -1.530  0.13  0.012  1.715  0.09  -0.054  -6.722  0.00  
CFO γ2 - -0.643  -16.005  0.00  -0.590  -18.373  0.00  -0.602  -18.637  0.00  
CFO*DCFO γ3 + 0.654  13.439  0.00  1.136  31.852  0.00  0.928  23.310  0.00  
TENURE γ4 ? 0.000  -0.405  0.69  0.000  0.341  0.73  0.000  0.200  0.84  
DCFO*TENURE γ5 ? 0.001  1.490  0.14  -0.001  -1.852  0.06  0.001  0.737  0.46  
CFO*TENURE γ6 ? 0.012  3.210  0.00  0.007  2.455  0.01  0.007  2.235  0.03  
CFO*DCFO*TENURE γ7 - -0.026  -4.328  0.00  -0.050  -13.610  0.00  -0.033  -8.010  0.00  
            
Adj-R2 (%)   14.80%   10.83%   10.52%   
No. of obs   5561   20858   8705   
 
 












conservatism is lowest (measured by coefficient α3) during the low litigation regime of 
1992-2001, Panel A shows that the incremental negative effect of auditor tenure on 
conservatism (measured by coefficient α7) is less negative in both high litigation regimes 
of 1988-1991 and 2002-2004 than in the low litigation regime of 1992-2001 (i.e., α7 = – 
0.012, – 0.009 vs. – 0.015).33  This may indicate that higher litigation risk constrains the 
adverse impact of long-term auditor client relationships on audit quality.  The regression 
results based on model (4) (i.e., the reversal of negative earnings changes) do not yield 
the predicted variation of conservatism over time (not reported); however, I find the 
predicted variation when I use the alternative measure of conservatism (i.e., model (8), 
accrual-based conservatism).  Table 12 Panel B presents this result, which shows that the 
magnitude of reduced conservatism due to longer auditor-client relationships is larger in 
the low auditor liability exposure regime of 1992-2001 than in other periods (i.e., γ7 = – 
0.050 vs. – 0.026, – 0.033).  Thus, it appears that the auditors’ exposure to liability risk 
can effectively mitigate the potential negative impact on auditor independence due to 
long-term auditor-client relationships.34  
 
7.2 The Effect of Large Client Influence 
                                                 
 
 
33 It is noticeable that the magnitude of conservatism (measured by coefficient α3) increases over 1988-
2004, which is consistent with Basu (1997), Givoly and Hayn (2000), Holthausen and Watts (2001) and 
Ryan and Zarowin (2003) that report an increasing pattern of conservative financial reporting over time. 
34 By using the delineation of litigation exposure risk suggested in Choi et al. (2004), I also find that the 
adverse impact of auditor tenure on conservatism varies with the different litigation risk periods. In 
particular, based on the timeliness of earnings to news and accrual-based conservatism, I find that the 
incremental effect of auditor tenure on conservatism is smaller during 1988-1989 and 1990-1994 (high 
litigation periods), the smallest in 2002-2004 (high litigation period), and the highest in 1995-2001(low 
litigation period). 
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DeAngelo (1981b) argues that the auditor-client relationship is a bilateral monopoly 
that creates an incentive for auditors to compromise their independence and report 
favorably in order to retain clients.  This incentive can be termed as economic 
dependence (Reynolds and Francis 2001).  Economic dependence theory predicts that 
clients with greater economic influence will adversely affect auditor independence, 
leading to lower audit quality.  During the long-term auditor-client relationships, audit 
revenue generated from the influential clients serves as an important annuity for an 
auditor.  Hence, the previously observed negative relation between auditor tenure and 
conservatism could be driven by the fact that auditors tend to compromise their 
independence and report aggressively for the clients with greater influence.   
To probe this plausibility, I re-estimate regressions that test the association between 
auditor tenure and conservatism by partitioning the full sample into quintiles on the basis 
of client influence.  I use the ratio of the client’s log of net sales over the sum of all 
clients’ log of net sales in an accounting firm as a proxy for client influence on the 
accounting firm (Chung and Kallapur 2003).  Table 13 presents the estimations of models 
(2) and (4) on the lowest and highest quintile of client importance.35  In particular, Panel 
A shows that the reduced timeliness of earnings to news (i.e., reduced conservatism) as 
auditor tenure increases applies to the firms with least influence (α7= – 0.014, p = 0.00), 
but not to the firms with greatest influence (α7= – 0.001, p = 0.43).  Similarly, the results 
in Panel B suggest that the reduced tendency of negative earnings changes to reverse (i.e., 
reduced conservatism) as tenure increases only applies to the firms in the lowest quintile  
                                                 
 
 
35 The results from the second, third, and fourth quintiles are qualitatively similar to the lowest quintile. 
Hence, I only report the results from the lowest and highest quintiles.    
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Table 13 




Panel A: Timeliness of earnings to news 
 





Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT α0 ? 0.017  1.745  0.08  0.058  25.424  0.00  
DR α1 ? 0.040  2.576  0.01  -0.005  -1.270  0.20  
R α2 + -0.011  -1.004  0.32  -0.002  -0.433  0.67  
DR*R α3 + 0.374  11.231  0.00  0.073  6.514  0.00  
TENURE α4 ? 0.001  1.524  0.13  0.000  1.188  0.23  
DR*TENURE α5 ? -0.002  -1.411  0.16  0.000  1.292  0.20  
R*TENURE α6 + 0.001  0.382  0.70  0.000  0.991  0.32  
R*DR*TENURE α7 - -0.014  -3.851  0.00  -0.001  -0.788  0.43  
         
Adj-R2 (%)   5.34%   4.18%   





























(Table 13 continued) 
Panel B: Persistence of earnings changes 
 
   Lowest client influence Highest client influence 
 Coeff 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate t-stat 
p-
value Estimate t-stat 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT β0  ? -0.024  -1.900  0.06  0.003  2.158  0.03  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.135  -7.641  0.00  0.002  0.834  0.40  
∆NIt-1 β2 - 0.139  6.538  0.00  0.023  0.774  0.44  
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1 β3 - -1.113  -36.758  0.00  -0.354  -9.182  0.00  
TENURE β4 ? 0.000  -0.170  0.86  0.000  -1.190  0.23  
D∆NIt-1*TENURE β5 ? 0.010  4.702  0.00  -0.001  -3.190  0.00  






0.052  8.762  0.00  -0.018  -6.950  0.00  
         
Adj-R2 (%)   40.85%   14.70%   
No. of obs   6874   6977   
 
a
 Client influence is defined as the proportion of client’s sales to total sales of all clients audited by an audit firm. Lowest (Highest) client influence group 
is the firms in the lowest (highest) quintile of client influence.  
 





of client influence (β7 = 0.052, p = 0.00).  For the firms with the greatest influence, Panel 
B shows that accounting conservatism actually increases as auditor tenure lengthens (β7= 
– 0.018, p = 0.00).36   
Thus, contrary to the prediction of economic dependence theory, I do not find 
evidence that firms with greater influence cause auditors to compromise their 
independence and report less conservatively as auditor-client relationships grow longer.  
In contrast, the results suggest that auditors’ concern about the higher litigation exposure 
associated with the largest firms dominates their incentives to retain those clients or that 
managers of these firms choose to report more conservatively.  
 
7.3 The Role of Industry Specialist 
Krishnan (2005b) finds that the earnings of clients of specialist auditors are more 
timely in reflecting bad news (that is, more conservative) than earnings of clients of non-
specialist auditors.  His finding is consistent with the previous studies that suggest that 
clients of industry specialists have higher earnings quality than clients of non-specialists 
(Balsam et al. 2003, Carcello and Nagy 2003, Krishnan 2003b, Dunn and Mayhew 2004).  
To examine the role played by auditor industry specialists in the association between 
auditor tenure and conservatism, I partition the full sample into two groups, that is, 
clients audited by industry specialists and clients audited by non-industry specialists.  
                                                 
 
 
36 By using the alternative measure of conservatism, i.e., accrual-based conservatism (not reported), I find 
impaired auditor independence and hence, reduced conservatism associated with longer auditor tenure, in 
the first, second, third and fourth quintiles of client influence, but the opposite result is found in the highest 
quintile of client influence.   
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I use the clients’ sales to proxy for auditor’s industry market shares in each two-digit 
SIC code.  I define auditor specialist in two ways.  First, specialists are identified 
following Palmrose (1986) as “the largest suppliers in each industry, as well as the 
second- and third-largest suppliers in industries in which readily observable differences 
existed between the second and the third or between the third and the remaining 
suppliers.”  Second, consistent with Balsam et al. (2003), I define an auditor as dominant 
specialist in an industry if it is the largest supplier in the industry and the difference 
between the first and second supplier in the industry is at least 10 percent.  
Table 14 reports the estimations from the regression models testing the association 
between auditor tenure and conservatism based on auditor specialist (dominant specialist) 
group vs. non-specialist (non-dominant specialist) group.  By using two measures of 
conservatism, Panel A and Panel B show the presence of reduced conservatism as auditor 
tenure increases in all groups except in the non-specialist group of Panel B.  Thus, 
consistent with Myers et al. (2003), I find that specialist (dominant specialist) auditors vs. 
non-specialist (non-dominant specialist) auditors make no difference on the adverse 
impact of auditor tenure on conservatism.  In other words, even auditor specialists appear 




Multivariate Regressions by Industry Specialist Group a 
 
Panel A: Timeliness of earnings to news 
 

























-0.005 -0.515  0.61  0.009  1.901  0.06  -0.002  -0.356  0.72  0.021  3.325  0.00  
DR α1 ? 0.031 1.905  0.06  0.046  6.175  0.00  0.043  4.816  0.00  0.036  3.505  0.00  
R α2 + -0.026 -1.931  0.05  -0.031  -5.309  0.00  -0.027  -3.786  0.00  -0.035  -4.243  0.00  
DR*R α3 + 0.468 12.774  0.00  0.479  27.973  0.00  0.483  23.702  0.00  0.452  18.479  0.00  












-0.016 -4.579  0.00  -0.014  -8.439  0.00  -0.015  -7.451  0.00  -0.014  -6.156  0.00  
               
Adj-R2 (%)   5.34%   8.10%   6.60%   8.07%   









(Table 14 continued) 
Panel B: Persistence of earnings changes 
 























CEPT β0  
? 
-0.017 -3.132 0.00 -0.018 -5.857 0.00 -0.029 -9.482 0.00 -0.008 -1.532 0.13  
D∆NIt-1 β1 ? -0.017 -1.991 0.05 -0.071 -14.801 0.00 -0.035 -7.372 0.00 -0.079 -9.184 0.00  




- -0.146 -4.162 0.00 -1.363 -109.165 0.00 -0.996 -73.039 0.00 -1.199 -55.367 0.00  














+ -0.093 -19.592 0.00 0.067 29.699 0.00 0.011 4.914 0.00 0.053 11.807 0.00  
               
Adj-R
2 
(%)   28.25%   57.12%   46.13%   54.14%   




Auditors are defined as industry specialists if the sales of all clients audited by one audit firm over total sales of clients in one industry (two-digit SIC 
code) is ranked as first, second, or third.  Auditors are defined as industry dominant if they are ranked first. 
 







The concern of the threat of auditor tenure on audit quality has been the subject of 
regulatory intervention.  Proponents of mandatory auditor rotation have alleged that the 
longer auditor-client relationships impair auditor independence, leading to auditors 
accepting clients’ relatively more aggressive accounting.  However, opponents of 
mandatory auditor rotation claim there is no evidence of this impaired auditor 
independence; rather they provide some evidence that shows a positive relation between 
auditor tenure and audit quality.  
The purpose of this study is to extend prior research by examining the association 
between auditor tenure and an important feature of accounting, namely conditional 
accounting conservatism.  Following the regulators’ concerns about longer auditor tenure, 
I hypothesize that firms with longer auditor tenure report less conservatively, where 
conservatism is operationalized by using the two approaches based on Basu (1997).  The 
overall results are consistent across both measures of conservatism.  In particular, the 
earnings of firms having long relationships with their auditor reflect unexpected losses 
less quickly, and their negative earnings changes are reversed more slowly, than those 
firms having short relationships with their auditor.  These findings suggest a negative 
association between auditor tenure and accounting conservatism.  
To make the findings more robust, I implement a series of sensitivity tests.  For 
example, I control for other sources of conservatism to avoid the possibility that the 
observed link between auditor tenure and conservatism is driven by those other factors 
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that relate to conservatism.  In addition, I adopt an additional measure of conservatism 
based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005).  All of these additional tests have limited impact 
on my findings.  Furthermore, I control for an endogeneity problem possibly arising from 
the auditor tenure variable, which is often ignored in previous studies.  Although the 
result of the endogeneity test shows no evidence of auditors with medium-term tenure 
reporting less conservatively than those with short-term tenure, it suggests that auditors 
with long-term tenure report significantly less conservatively than those with short or 
medium-term tenure.  The high explanatory power in my tests and all the consistent 
results across various tests strengthen the robustness of the results. 
There are three findings from additional tests.  First, I find that auditors’ litigation 
exposure mitigates the adverse effect of longer auditor tenure on accounting conservatism.  
Specifically, the evidence appears to show that the extent of reduced conservatism 
associated with longer auditor tenure is mitigated during the higher litigation regime.  
Second, I find that the negative impact of auditor tenure on conservatism can not be 
applied to the most influential clients, which is contrary to the economic dependence 
theory that suggests that the largest clients would induce incentives for auditors to retain 
them by reporting favorably.  This finding is consistent with the notion that for their 
largest clients, auditors’ litigation concerns and reputation protection dominate their 
opportunistic practices (Reynolds and Francis 2001).  Third, I do not find evidence 
showing that industry specialists play a role in constraining impaired auditor 
independence for longer auditor-client relationships.   
Given the importance of conservatism in accounting practice and its nature in current 
accounting standards (e.g., much discretion in compliance), my study provides direct 
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evidence of the effect of longer auditor-client relationships on audit quality.  The results 
have implications for the debate surrounding the issue of mandatory audit firm rotation.  
To the extent that reduced conservatism is due to the overfamilarity or over trust after 
long-term interactions between auditors and their clients, which impairs auditor 
independence either consciously or subconsciously, mandatory audit firm rotation could 
mitigate the decline documented in this study.  Although SOX has not mandated audit 
firm rotation but requires audit partner rotation every five years, future research is 
necessary to investigate whether audit partner rotation is a good substitute for audit firm 
rotation in mitigating any potential adverse impact of long auditor tenure on audit quality.  
In addition, given the firm size effect on conservatism suggested in prior studies (Giner 
and Rees 2001, Basu 2001), future research is also called for to examine whether the 
reduced conservatism due to impaired auditor independence arising from longer auditor-
client relationships can be found in firms audited by those non-big audit firms (i.e., small 























Source: Givoly et al. (2007).




the book value of 
the firm’s equity 
relative to its 
economic value) 
 
Financial Reporting Features that 
Contribute to Conservatism 
Standard Setters and Regulators Management 
C1:  
Failure to capture 
the positive 
present value of 
projects and 
subsequent 
increases in value 
of assets 
Historical cost convention coupled 
with the transaction-based 
accounting approach and the 
assumptions of going concern and a 
stable monetary unit 
No discretion as long as the historical cost 
framework is adopted. Discretion exists, 
however, on whether to move to pure market 
valuation or allow a deviation from historical 
cost for certain items (e.g., marketable 
securities) or in certain situations (e.g., 
hyperinflation).  
Limited or no discretion 
C2:  
Minimization of 
the carrying value 
of net assets in 
place 
Choices of income-deferring 
methods and estimates within the 
historical cost framework 
Discretion in prescribing accounting methods 
(e.g., accounting for R&D, goodwill, executive 
stock options; revenue recognition criteria; 
inflation accounting) 
Discretion in:  
 • choosing among acceptable alternative accounting 
methods (inventory, depreciation),  
 • implementing rules (e.g. for loss contingencies, cost 
capitalization, revenue recognition) and  




losses relative to 
gains 
Asymmetric treatment of gains and 
losses through means such as LCM  
(Note that losses in value are not 
captured by LCM until the market 
value falls below the book value of 
the asset.) 
Discretion in prescribing accounting rules for 
impairment and loss contingencies  
Limited discretion (within the historical cost 
framework) to prescribe or prohibit recognition 
of unrealized gains (e.g., marketable securities) 
Discretion in the timing and amount of implementing LCM  
No accounting discretion with respect to the recognition of 
unrealized gains. Some discretion with respect to the 
classification of securities as trading or available-for-sale, 




VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
 
TENURE the number of years since the auditors have been employed 
TA total assets at the end of fiscal year 
NI net income before extraordinary items reported at the fiscal 
year-end divided by beginning of fiscal year total assets 
R market adjusted annual stock return for firm i at the fiscal 
year-end 
DR an indicator variable that is equal to one if the market 
adjusted return during year t is negative, and zero otherwise 
∆NIt change in net income before extraordinary items for in fiscal 
year-end deflated by beginning-of-year total assets 
∆NI t-1 change in net income in last fiscal year deflated by 
beginning-of-year total assets 
D∆NIt-1 an indicator variable that is equal to one if ∆NI t-1 is 
negative, and zero otherwise 
BM the Book to Market ratio, defined as the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the fiscal year-end 
LEV leverage ratio, defined as total debt divided by total assets at 
the fiscal year-end 
LIGA the probability of auditor litigation, calculated using the 
parameters from Table 3 of Shu (2000) 
SIZE the natural log of firm’s market value of equity at the fiscal 
year-end 
ACCRUAL net income before extraordinary items minus its operating 
cash flows at fiscal year-end, deflated by beginning-of-year 
total assets    
CFO operating cash flows at fiscal year-end deflated by 
beginning-of-year total assets    
DCFO an indicator variable that is equal to one if CFO is negative, 












CONTROL FOR ENDOGENEITY – THE FIRST STAGE MODELS  
 
TENUREit = δ0 + δ1SIZEit+ δ2LEVit + δ3INVENTORYit + δ4ARit + δ5CURRENTit + δ6ROAit + δ7TECHit + δ8GROWTHit + δ9RETURNit + δ10BETAit + δ11VOLATILITYit  
+ δ12DLOSS + δ13LASTOPINIONit + δ14OPINIONit + δ15DELISTit + δ16SEGMENTit + δ17FIRMAGE + ε 
 
 Short vs. Medium Medium vs. Long Short vs. Long 









INTERCEPT 0.642  163.323  0.00  -0.797  275.921  0.00  -0.056  1.094  0.30  
SIZE 0.021  10.231  0.00  0.019  9.425  0.00  0.033  23.574  0.00  
LEV -0.050  1.436  0.23  -0.267  44.167  0.00  -0.302  44.776  0.00  
INVENTORY 0.038  0.411  0.52  0.362  45.296  0.00  0.474  53.908  0.00  
AR -0.014  0.069  0.79  0.243  19.067  0.00  0.199  8.768  0.00  
CURRENT -0.001  0.833  0.36  0.000  0.006  0.94  -0.001  0.420  0.52  
ROA 0.210  0.854  0.36  -0.097  0.137  0.71  0.201  0.495  0.48  
TECH 0.031  1.483  0.22  -0.034  2.216  0.14  -0.015  0.316  0.57  
GROWTH -0.003  1.559  0.21  -0.015  5.813  0.02  -0.019  6.640  0.01  
RETURN -0.031  3.367  0.07  0.019  1.478  0.22  -0.023  1.619  0.20  
BETA 0.020  2.446  0.12  0.032  7.706  0.01  0.043  10.227  0.00  
VOLATILITY 0.189  0.132  0.72  -2.706  26.748  0.00  -2.926  23.334  0.00  
DLOSS -0.014  0.381  0.54  -0.027  1.701  0.19  -0.036  2.414  0.12  
LASTOPINION -0.188  56.803  0.00  0.030  1.703  0.19  -0.194  65.238  0.00  
OPINION -0.131  28.655  0.00  -0.002  0.011  0.92  -0.105  19.745  0.00  
DELIST -0.357  13.566  0.00  -0.025  0.049  0.83  -0.399  12.522  0.00  
SEGMENT -0.026  13.702  0.00  -0.032  26.169  0.00  -0.041  40.142  0.00  
FIRMAGE -0.016  303.744  0.00  0.055  4094.023  0.00  0.033  1357.752  0.00  
          
Likelihood Ratio 738.839   0.00  7688.208   0.00  2723.834   0.00  
Wald 725.362   0.00  5688.970   0.00  2317.370   0.00  
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N 18866   27371   32363   
 
TENURE = Long or medium tenure group is coded as one when compared with short tenure group (coded as zero); Long tenure group is coded one when 
compared with medium tenure group (coded as zero), where short tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than three years; 
Medium tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships less than or equal to eight years but greater than or equal to four years; and long 
tenure group contains firms with auditor-client relationships longer than or equal to nine years. SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets. LEV = long term 
debt over total assets. Inventory = inventory divided by total assets at the beginning of fiscal year. AR = account receivable divided by total assets at the 
beginning of fiscal year. CURRENT = current assets divided by current liabilities. ROA = net income divided by total assets. TECH = a dummy variable, 
equal to one if a firm’s SIC code is in the 2830s, 3570s, 7370s, 8730s, and between 3825 and 3839, and zero otherwise. GROWTH = sales growth. 
RETURN = the compounded annual return over the fiscal year. BETA = the slope coefficient of a regression of daily stock returns on equal-weighted 
market returns. DLOSS = a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm reports a negative earning in current year or prior year; and zero otherwise. 
VOLATILITY = the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. LASTOPINION = a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm has not 
received a completely clean opinion from its auditor in last year, and zero otherwise. OPINION = a dummy variable, equal to one if a firm has not 
received a completely clean opinion from its auditor in current year, and zero otherwise. DELIST = a dummy variable, equal to one if firm is delisted 
because of financial difficulties within the next year, and zero otherwise. SEGMENT= the reported number of business segments. FIRMAGE = the 
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